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It is rare that Americans wonder about what happened to the Panama Canal after the 
United States turned it over to Panama in 1999. Since 2000, the Panamanians have been 
able to transform the canal into a profitable enterprise and successfully revert a good deal 
of Canal Zone infrastructure to public use through a combination of positive political 
decision-making, fiscally beneficial economic policies, and constructive management. 
The United States created the nation of Panama, built and managed the canal, and finally 
begrudgingly handed over sovereignty. To this extent, Panama’s success is our success. 
Yet there has been surprising little real analysis of the changes in Panama that have 
resulted from a decade of ownership of the canal and the land surrounding it. It is time to 
appraise the results so far. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PANAMA: OWNING THE CANAL  
The history of the Panama Canal tells a story of how the United States created the 
nation of Panama, built the canal, managed it, and then turned it over to the people of 
Panama. The story took place over a one hundred-year time span, and there are still those, 
in America at least, who wonder whether it has had a happy ending or not. At the same 
time, Panama has faded from the public eye in the United States. It is rare that Americans 
wonder about what happened to the Panama Canal after “we” left Panama. But since 
2000, the Panamanians have been able to turn the canal into a profitable enterprise and 
successfully plan for reverted Canal Zone lands through a combination of positive 
political decision-making, fiscally beneficial economic policies and constructive 
management techniques. The aim of this thesis is to show how this is being 
accomplished. 
Much of the available literature about the Panama Canal at the time of its transfer 
to Panamanian control culminates in predictions about the challenges Panama would 
have to overcome in running the canal and managing the surrounding land zone. A 
characteristic example is Mark Falcoff, Panama’s Canal: What Happens When the 
United States Gives a Small Country What It Wants, who proposed that Panama would 
struggle to manage the vast amount of territory and infrastructure that was being thrust 
upon it, including over 10 U.S. military bases; and that it was not clear how to turn the 
canal, a previously non-profit venture, into a profit-generating business to support the 
Panamanian economy.1 These challenges appeared to be vindicated by the difficulty the 
Panamanians experienced in maintaining the Panama Canal Railroad, one of the first 
assets turned over by the United States, in 1979.2 That, needless to say, is not the end of 
the story. Yet, analysis about what happened to the canal after the United States withdrew 
its troops and handed over control is largely absent from scholarly discourse.  
                                                 
1 Mark Falcoff, Panama’s Canal: What Happens When the United States Gives a Small Country What 
It Wants (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1998), 111–112. 
2 Ibid., 101. 
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This thesis studies how Panama overcame the twin challenges of turning a profit 
from the canal, and reverting property in the Canal Zone to support a growing economy. 
The thesis will chronicle the actions and policies that Panama instituted in the Canal Zone 
to fill the void created by the withdrawal of the United States. The questions addressed 
are: what happened to those former U.S. military bases and how did Panama turn the 
canal into a profit-making enterprise? Five democratically elected presidents have held 
office in Panama since the ousting by the United States of military dictator Manuel 
Noriega in 1989. Since 1990, the Panamanian presidents have replaced the Panamanian 
military with a public police force, instituted economic reforms, and depoliticized the 
management of the canal.3 There is a huge gap in reviewing the lessons learned of the 
Panamanians since they have controlled the Panama Canal and adjacent property for over 
10 years. What has worked over the last decade to explain their successful management 
of the Canal? What investments have been made for the future of the Canal Zone? What 
challenges remain in the Canal Zone? Successes in the Panama Canal Zone can reveal a 
great deal about what a small country is able to accomplish without interference of a 
hegemonic big brother.  
B. IMPORTANCE OF TOPIC 
This topic is important because it illustrates that after 100 years of U.S. control, 
Panama has been able to find its own way without direct American involvement. 
Successes in the Canal Zone are successes for the nation of Panama. And success for 
Panama is success for the United States, in terms of stability in a country that owns and 
maintains a global asset that is important to both the United States’ and the world’s 
economies. It could be argued that the United States has been pleased with Panama’s 
progress over the last decade and has appreciated that it has not had to interfere anymore 
in the Central American country. The United States still characterizes the U.S.-
Panamanian relationship as close, primarily consisting of “extensive counter-narcotics 
cooperation; support to promote Panama’s economic, political, and social development; 
and a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) that entered into force at the end of October 
                                                 
3 Mark P. Sullivan, Panama: Political and Economic Conditions and Relations, CRS Report RL 
30981 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 3–4. 
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2012.”4 A weak or failing Panama, or mismanagement of the Panama Canal, would be 
unacceptable to the United States, as indicated by the U.S. interpretation of the Canal 
Treaty of Neutrality. As explained by Falcoff, the U.S. definition of neutrality for the 
canal meant the United States could appeal to a wide range of options, including the right 
for unilateral intervention, should anything go wrong.5 The canal is too important to 
worldwide maritime trade to allow unrest in Panama, and it would be in the United 
States’s immediate interest to intervene in Panama to prevent instability.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
David McCullough, acclaimed historian and author of the award-winning book 
The Path between the Seas, reveals the intricacies of the political, financial and 
engineering establishments of early history of securing the authority and building the 
Panama Canal. Robert C. Harding also presents a thorough timeline of events beginning 
in 1501 in his History of Panama. Both authors provide solid facts about the original 
ownership of the canal by the French and the ultimately controversial 1903 Hay-Bunau-
Varilla Treaty that gave the United States the authority to build and lease the canal “in 
perpetuity,” almost immediately causing great angst for the Panamanians.6 
Besides historical review, the remainder of academic literature written about the 
Panama Canal covers the controversy of turning the canal over to the Panamanians and 
the foreign policy dilemma created in the United States by the controversy. A detailed 
review of the political complexities of the canal dispute is provided in Paul B. Ryan’s The 
Panama Canal Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy and Defense Interests.7 He explains the 
political developments in the 1970s, as well as President Jimmy Carter’s personal agenda 
and his relationship with Panamanian dictator Omar Torrijos leading up to the 1977 
Panama Canal Treaties.  
                                                 
4 Sullivan, Panama: Political, Introduction. 
5 Falcoff, Panama’s Canal, 17–18. 
6 David McCullough, Path between the Seas (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1977); 
Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006). 
7 Paul B. Ryan, The Panama Canal Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy and Defense Interests (Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 6–7. 
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Author G. Russell Evans writes a strongly worded case for the United States to 
retain rights to the Panama Canal. From his point of view, turning over the canal to 
Panama would be the first step toward its eventual demise, as implied by his book’s title, 
Death Knell of the Panama Canal? Evans alleges that since enactment of the treaty, the 
Panamanians allowed the canal to slip into disrepair due to lack of maintenance and 
turned over the port concessions on both ends of the canal to a communist Chinese 
company.8 He provides an example of the strongest views against turning over the canal. 
Two American authors that seek to present the controversy from a more 
Panamanian point of the view are Denison Kitchel and Michael L. Conniff. Kitchel’s The 
Truth About the Panama Canal shows that the foreign policy dilemma that the United 
States faced was whether or not to be blackmailed by a small country in Latin America, 
which could have caused all types of instability in the region if sovereignty over the canal 
was withheld.9 In Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance, Conniff provides 
a well-rounded study of the U.S.-Panamanian relationship from completion of the canal 
in 1914 through 1999, which he characterizes as a “forced alliance.”10 He contends that 
while U.S.-Panamanian interconnectedness over the Panama Canal was mutually 
beneficial for both nations at the onset, he argues that Panama, the weaker partner, was 
overwhelmingly and unfairly influenced by the United States in the long run.11 He 
concludes that the people of Panama were fed up with not having sovereignty over their 
own territory and that they were being cheated from economic gain by the United States.  
By the time the canal finally changed hands, Panamanians, as well as Latinos in 
general, had come to view the United States as an oppressor. Colombian author Virgilio 
Araúz expresses this view in La Lucha por la Soberanía y la política actual de la 
Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (The Fight for Sovereignty and the Actual Political 
                                                 
8 G. Russell Evans, Death Knell of the Panama Canal?: The Fate of the 8th Wonder of the World After 
the United States Relinquishes Control (Fairfax, VA: National Security Center, 1997), 1. 
9 Denison Kitchel, The Truth About the Panama Canal (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1978), 
29–30. 
10 Michael L.Conniff, Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance, 2nd ed. (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 2001), 2. 
11Conniff, Panama and the United States, 2. 
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Authority of the Panama Canal) that the United States maintained imperialistic 
governance over Panama under the false pretense of maintaining security for the canal. 
He asserts the United States deliberately imposed exploitative policies and created crises, 
such as the ousting of Manuel Noriega, to justify its presence.12 Other books in Spanish 
indicate the Panamanians had a plan for the canal, as one could surmise from the title 
Visión Nacional sobre el Canal y las Áreas Revertidas (National Vision about the Canal 
and its Reverted Areas) written in 1999 by Panamanian history professor Reymundo 
Gurdian Guerra.13 
Mark Falcoff describes the debate within the United States over returning the 
canal to Panama. Those who were opposed to turning over the canal had many reasons to 
object. Most of them were either worried about U.S. interests regarding national security, 
or they opposed turning over the canal on the basis of U.S. national pride.14 Additionally, 
the opposition claimed that Panama could not possibly manage such a complex enterprise 
and predicted great doom and gloom for Panama once the United States relinquished 
control of the canal.15  
The most recent book in English on the Panama Canal is The Big Ditch: How 
America Took, Built, and Gave Away the Panama Canal. Written in 2011 by authors 
Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, the book concentrates on U.S. imperialism from an 
economic perspective, and explains the eventual divestment of the canal in terms of the 
gradual deterioration of its economic benefits to the United States. Maurer and Yu argue 
that the newly established and politically neutral Panama Canal Administration “ran the 
canal much more efficiently and commercially than the United States ever did,” an 
outlook that the findings of this thesis support.16 
                                                 
12 Virgilio Araúz, La Lucha por La Soberanía y La Política Actual de La Autoridad del Canal de 
Panamà (Centenario de Qué!: July 2, 2002), 6. 
13 Reymundo Gurdián Guerra, Visión Nacional Sobre el Canal y Las Áreas Revertidas (Panama: 
Editorial Universitaria “Carlos Manuel Gasteazoro,” 1999). 
14 Falcoff, Panama’s Canal, 12. 
15 Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America Tool, Built, and Gave Away the Panama 
Canal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 2, 111–112. 
16 Maurer and Yu, The Big Ditch, 10. 
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Although academic literature on the canal is scant from 2000 onward, other 
sources of information such as journal articles and websites provided a good deal of 
useful information. One former Panama Canal Commission deputy administrator, Joseph 
W. Cornelison, wrote in a May 2000 article for the Journal of Commerce that Panama 
had a bright future ahead of it and was full of opportunity for domestic and foreign 
businesses. He indicated that the Panamanian government had made a wise decision to 
“insulate” the operating authority of the canal from political interference, and flatly 
denied the Chinese were taking over control of the canal. Additionally, he predicted that 
tourism and ecotourism were “areas of great opportunity.”17 This was the starting point 
for post-2000 exploration. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized chronologically in five chapters, plus a conclusion. 
Chapter II provides a historical overview of how the United States came to build and own 
the Panama Canal, and the creation of the “forced alliance” with Panama. Chapter III 
reviews the years and events leading up to the signing of the 1979 Carter-Torrijos Treaty, 
as well as the controversy and debate surrounding the turnover of the Canal to the 
Panamanians.  
Chapter IV will cover the years between the signing of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty 
and completed turnover of the Panama Canal in 1999. These were crucial years as the 
United States gradually granted pieces of the Canal Zone to Panama. Politically, Panama 
emerged from years of military dictatorship, to establish democratically elected 
leadership that enacted policies beneficial to the country’s future administrative and 
economic success. This was also a period when the United States provided constructive 
on-the-job training to Panama in different aspects of canal management.  
Chapter V of the thesis will survey and analyze the changes in the Panama Canal 
Zone that have happened since Panama regained sovereignty over its territory. This 
section will recount the manner in which many of the former U.S. military bases have 
                                                 
17 Joseph W. Cornelison, “Panama Canal on Threshold of a Bright Future,” JOC, May 26, 2000, 
https://www.joc.com/panama-canal-threshold-bright-future_20000525.html 
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been turned into profitable investments and businesses that significantly support 
Panama’s economy. It will also assess the Panama Canal Authority’s operations. 
Additionally, Panamanian strategies, such as direct foreign investment and canal 
expansion, will be examined for their roles in the Panamanian economy. 
Finally, Chapter VI assesses the rewards of Panama’s efforts in the supposition 
that Panama has transformed itself into an emerging economy. The conclusion offers 
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II. SHORT HISTORY 
Early discussions between the United States and Central American governments 
about building an interoceanic canal across the isthmus took place in the mid-1800s. The 
U.S. foreign policy initiative was spurred by the onset of the Spanish-American War in 
1898. As the U.S.S. Oregon set sail from San Francisco and headed for the Caribbean—
all the way around South America—”the world watched and waited,” as she traveled 
thirteen thousand miles, to get there just in time for the end of the war. Then the race was 
on to build a canal!18 Negotiations pertaining to building the Panama Canal took place in 
1902 when the U.S. Congress passed the Spooner Act, which specified the conditions 
under which the United States would build a canal in Panama. The French had started 
such a project in the 1880s and failed miserably due to tropical disease and 
mismanagement. The Spooner Act stipulated that then President Theodore Roosevelt 
could only offer up to $40 million to buy the canal concession, that there would be a six-
mile zone in which to operate, and that the concession would remain in perpetuity. Under 
the auspices of the Spooner Act, U.S. Secretary of State John M. Hay and negotiators 
worked to construct the Hay-Herran Treaty with Colombia, of which Panama was still a 
province. The Colombian government was suspicious that the Americans and other 
foreign interests had conspired to prevent Colombia from receiving a fair share of returns 
from the canal, and rejected the terms of the Hay-Herran Treaty in 1903.19 President 
Roosevelt was adamant that Panama was the perfect location for a trans-isthmus canal 
and wanted to capitalize on what the French had already started. He was under 
considerable pressure to negotiate an acceptable treaty with the Colombians before 
Congress voted to build a different canal in Nicaragua.20 
Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla was a French engineer who worked on the original 
canal initiative in Panama during the 1880s. In 1894, he became an investor in the French 
company Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal de Panama that bought the concession and 
                                                 
18 Kitchel, The Truth About the Panama Canal, 41; Conniff, Panama and The United States, 64–65. 
19 Conniff, Panama and The United States, 64–65. 
20 Kitchel, The Truth About the Panama Canal, 51. 
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remaining assets of the first French company that had failed. Bunau-Varilla had a major 
interest in seeing the United States succeed in negotiating a canal treaty with Colombia, 
as his company was to be paid handsomely for the concession and assets.21  
The province of Panama was in the midst of a struggle for independence from 
Colombia and the Panamanians respected Bunau-Varilla as an engineer and businessman. 
Panamanian leaders often sought advice from him and believed he represented their best 
interests. Bunau-Varilla encouraged the Panamanians to engage the Americans in 
assisting them with independence from Colombia. He even provided the revolutionaries 
with funding, a recommended constitution, and a sample Panamanian flag.22  
When the Panamanian revolutionists requested assistance from the United States 
in their quest for independence, Roosevelt obliged by sending a Navy warship off the 
coast of Colon, a port city on the Caribbean side of Panama. The Panamanian revolution 
against Colombian forces occurred on November 4, 1903 without the actual assistance of 
the U.S. Navy or U.S. aid. Panama declared its independence and a provisional 
government was placed in control of the isthmus. The new nation appointed Bunau-
Varilla as its minister to the United States. The United States officially recognized 
Panama as a legitimate republic two days later.23 
Bunau-Varilla wasted no time in departing for Washington as an official 
representative of Panama, where he urged Secretary Hay to work quickly with him on an 
agreement for a Panama Canal that would be advantageous to both of them. An official 
delegation from Panama was on its way to Washington, and Bunau-Varilla pressed 
Secretary Hay with a sense of urgency, suspecting that his authority would be minimized 
and the treaty would not progress as he hoped. Secretary Hay agreed that Bunau-Varilla’s 
version of what was essentially the U.S. proposal that had been rejected by Colombia was 
to be signed with only one change—Secretary Hay changed the wording of one phrase in 
                                                 
21 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. “Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla,” accessed November 1, 2013, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/84597/Philippe-Jean-Bunau-Varilla. 
22 Kitchel, The Truth About the Panama Canal, 54; “Encyclopedia Britannica, “Philippe-Jean Bunau-
Varilla.” 
23 Kitchel, The Truth About the Panama Canal, 55. 
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Article II of the treaty from “leases in perpetuity” to “grants to the United States in 
perpetuity the use, occupation and control.”24 
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 was signed between Secretary Hay and 
Bunau-Varilla at 6:40 p.m. on November 18, “assuring the construction of a canal under 
U.S. control and providing millions for shareholders in the Compagnie Nouvelle.”25 A 
stunned Panamanian delegation arrived at 9:40 p.m. to find the Panama Canal deal was 
already completed. Despite having been confronted with a fait accompli, the Panamanian 
provisional government felt it had no choice but to ratify the treaty. The result was what 
author Michael L. Conniff characterized as a “forced alliance,”26 without which Panama 
would have risked losing its newly gained independence that the United States had 
agreed to guarantee.27 
The building of the Panama Canal was an amazing feat of U.S. engineering, and 
the result would prove to be a durable symbol of U.S. ingenuity, power, and national 
vitality. It was the canal’s symbolic significance, rather than its commercial value, that 
gave it such an enduring emotional hold on American society. 
The canal and the territorial zone that surrounded it also symbolized America’s 
strategic preeminence in the western hemisphere—a concrete construction of the Monroe 
Doctrine (literally). The United States built more than 20 military bases in Panama, 
including a military jungle warfare school during World War II that trained scores of 
military officers from Latin American countries in the art of counterinsurgency. The zone 
was a hub for valuable intelligence operations as well as a launch site for American 
troops to any part of South America.28 
From the beginning, Panamanians were unhappy in their alliance with the United 
States. Problems about how to operate an American canal and manage the zone while 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 56. 
25 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla.” 
26 Conniff, Panama and The United States, 3. 
27 Kitchel, The Truth About the Panama Canal, 56–57. 
28 Conniff, Panama and The United States, 109–110. 
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living in peace with the surrounding Panamanian communities arose quickly. President 
Roosevelt was amenable to making the best of the situation and instituted policies such as 
limiting free importations to the zone to only energy and construction materials, waiving 
tariffs on Panamanian goods entering the zone, allowing Panamanians into zone hospitals 
and constructing a highway for more convenient travel. But underlying every problem, 
whether from commercial or Panamanian government interests, was the issue of 
sovereignty, which continued to fester and irritate the Panamanians no matter how many 
agreeable policies the United States implemented. In order to build the canal the United 
States had to import most of its own enterprises, from commissaries to hotels to coffee, to 
support the people and institutions required for such a massive project. As will be 
explained in more detail later, most of this U.S. government business competed directly 
with emerging Panamanian enterprise and was damaging to the Panamanian economy.29  
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III. U.S. CONTROL AND GRADUAL CONCESSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Because of the never-ending presence of the United States, the Panamanians were 
never free from the issue of sovereignty and constantly reminded of what was not theirs 
to control. As time went by, and particularly after the canal officially began operating in 
1914, many problems arose that had not been foreseen under the terms of the original 
treaty (the sole purpose of which was to secure the concession necessary to create the 
canal in the first place). An attempt to renegotiate the 1903 treaty in 1926 failed, but the 
election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as the U.S. president a few years later provided the 
impetus for a new effort, since Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy promised to take U.S. 
relations with Latin America in a new non-interventionist direction.  
B. 1936 HULL-ALFARO TREATY 
Roosevelt’s election as U.S. president coincided almost exactly with that of 
Arnulfo Arias as president of Panama. Both presidents confronted difficult economic 
conditions, brought on by the collapse of the American stock market in 1929, and the 
subsequent contraction of world trade, on which Panama in particular was especially 
dependent. President Arias tried different tactics to improve economic conditions, but by 
1934 when the Panamanian national bank defaulted, he had no choice but to pursue 
additional revenue from the Panama Canal. Arias traveled to Washington, DC, to engage 
directly with Roosevelt. Roosevelt was sympathetic to the economic woes of Panama and 
agreed to overturn two of the 1903 treaty provisions: “the explicit right of the United 
States to intervene in Colon and Panama City, and the implicit right of freewheeling 
merchants in the Zone to compete with Panamanians in selling to tourists or in Panama 
itself.”30 Additionally, Roosevelt requested Congress to allocate funds for deporting 
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some of the West Indians who were taking jobs in the Canal Zone that might have 
otherwise been filled by Panamanians.31 
From that point, negotiators from the United States and Panama then met 110 
times from July 1934 to March 1936, when the new Hull-Alfaro Treaty was signed, 
which “marked a significant, if short step toward recognizing Panamanian rights.”32 The 
new treaty provided concessions that were economically advantageous to the 
Panamanians, including permitting Panamanian businesses to bid on contracts inside the 
Zone, the right for Panama to tax its own citizens working on the canal, increasing the 
annual annuity from $250,000 to $430,000, and conveyance of complete control over 
immigration into the nation, including the zone.33  
Additionally, the Hull-Alfaro Treaty provided three major changes that were 
advocated by Panama under its quest for total sovereign control on the Canal Zone itself: 
abrogation of Article I of the 1903 treaty, which had guaranteed Panama’s independence 
by the United States; elimination of the United States’ right to unilaterally intervene to 
preserve order in Panama; and the replacement of America’s unilateral obligation to 
defend the canal with an agreement that its defense would be the shared responsibility of 
the two governments. These concessions for Panama to guarantee its own independence, 
to maintain its own security outside of the zone and share in the defense of the canal, and 
an increased annuity for the canal, were huge victories for the nation of Panama.34 
Furthermore, the new treaty provided a much sought after provision by Panama—U.S. 
recognition of Panama’s sovereignty over its entire territory. Article III of the treaty 
stated, “The Canal Zone is territory of the Republic of Panama under the jurisdiction of 
the United States,” providing confirmation of Panama’s right of sovereignty over the 
zone.35 
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Roosevelt was of the view that a good relationship with Panama was increasingly 
important under the purview of his Good Neighbor Policy. He believed that economic 
stability increased the security of the canal. Relations between the United States and 
Panama started to improve and Roosevelt even “raised the United States legation in 
Panama City to embassy level, pleasing status-conscious Panamanians while signifying 
the importance FDR placed in the area.”36 
The U.S. Senate did not agree with Roosevelt’s theory and refused to ratify the 
treaty for three years. The final version of the treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1939 
contained less than Roosevelt had negotiated, much to the dismay of Panama. Congress 
reversed Roosevelt’s promise to hire more Panamanians to work on the canal, 
specifically allocating high-paying jobs for U.S. citizens only. The approach of war in 
both Europe and Asia in the early 1940s heightened American concerns about the 
security of the connection between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and it soon became 
clear that the United States had no intention of honoring the terms of the 1936 Treaty 
anytime soon. In reality, zone commissaries did not offer contracts to Panamanian 
merchants. Not only did Washington renege on promises to send back West Indian 
immigrants, the United States actually imported more Jamaican labor to work on a new 
third lock system. And, when Panama refused U.S. demands for additional lands for ten 
air-tracking base sites, the United States took them anyway. The Panamanian economy 
remained “unhealthy and unbalanced.”37 
C. TREATY OF 1955  
In 1952, charismatic Panamanian National Guard Leader Jose Antonio Remón 
was elected to the presidency. Despite the institution of sound economic reforms, Panama 
“lacked the internal market, investment capital, and governmental lending powers”38 
rendering it economically crippled. Remón believed part of any new reform should 
include increased revenues from the Panama Canal. He boldly requested new treaty 
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negotiations with President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his negotiators pressed for an 
extensive list of reforms, to include many of the reforms from the 1936 treaty with which 
the United States had still not complied. Most importantly, Remón insisted on U.S. 
recognition of Panamanian sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone and equal 
representation of both countries’ flags. President Eisenhower “wished to concede where 
U.S. vital interests were not at stake.”39 Eisenhower was open to negotiations with the 
exception of ceding U.S. control over the canal and Canal Zone, and limiting the costs of 
concessions. Dialogues continued while mounting external events influenced the 
negotiations as well. President Remón’s wife, Cecilia, complained in a speech to the 
Organization of American States that the United States was discriminating against 
Panama in the Canal Zone, which she claimed played directly into the hands of the 
communists. In Egypt, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had seized the Suez Canal while 
overthrowing the Egyptian government in a coup. The Egyptian uprising caused 
considerable angst for the U.S. government who feared Panama might consider a similar 
action over the Panama Canal.40  
In 1955, a treaty was finally signed providing some major concessions to Panama, 
mostly of the economic variety. The final draft of the 1955 treaty included the following: 
 The U.S. increased its annual annuity to $1.9 million  
 The U.S. relinquished its monopoly of railroad and highway construction  
 The U.S. surrendered its authority to control Panama City and Colon 
sanitation systems  
 The U.S. commissaries became prohibited from selling goods to anyone 
other than U.S. citizens and Panamanians that lived in the zone;  
 The U.S. representatives would purchase supplies from Panama, subject 
“to the discretion of the Zone’s purchasing agents.”41  
 The U.S. would turn over some lands outside of the zone to Panama, 
although Panama agreed to 19,000 acres in Rio Hato for 15 years of use 
by the U.S. military.42  
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Eisenhower went one step further and signed a personal “Memorandum of 
Understanding Reached” whereby he promised to affect more equality within the zone, 
provide more opportunities for Panamanians, and request from Congress a single and 
equal wage for all employees working Canal jobs, regardless of whether they were 
American or Panamanian. But the United States refused to budge on the 1903 Treaty 
sovereignty rights and refused to give Panama a share in the tolls. The United States was 
not in a hurry to honor many of the stipulations of the 1955 Treaty, preferring the status 
quo as much as possible, and generally providing only lip service to its obligations.43 
D. DETERIORATING RELATIONS AND THE FLAG RIOTS 
As mentioned, Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956—a move the United 
States ultimately backed at the expense of two important allies, Britain and France—
inspired Panamanian leaders to push harder for more reforms in the Panama Canal Zone. 
Of particular irritation to the Panamanians were the unequal wages for Panamanians 
doing the same work as Americans in the zone. By 1959, the atmosphere in Panama was 
contentious, with incidents of Cuban assisted insurgency movements and organized labor 
movements demanding better concessions from the Panamanian government. On 
Independence Day, November 3, 1959, students aided by prominent political figures 
made their way to the Canal Zone to raise the Panamanian flag and assert their 
sovereignty. When zone police and Army units arrived, widespread rioting erupted and 
American buildings were burned. A second series of riots took place a month later, 
leading military observers to note that these riots “were better organized, involved larger 
crowds, and were more violent in their expression of anti-U.S. sentiments than were those 
of 3 November.”44 President Eisenhower quickly moved to provide aid, procure goods, 
and recognize Panama’s sovereignty symbolically by passing a presidential directive to 
fly the Panamanian flag alongside the U.S. flag at the embassy and Shaler’s Triangle, an 
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important central plaza in the zone named after James R. Shaler, one of Panama’s 
founding revolutionaries.45 
In the early 1960s, U.S. President John F. Kennedy continued to work with 
Panama. He supplemented President Eisenhower’s aid program with additional financial 
aid in order to prevent Panama’s newly elected government, headed by President Roberto 
Chiari, from becoming too inspired by Cuban leader Fidel Castro’s or any other 
communist regime. But while he impassively listened to Chiari’s grievances, Kennedy 
had his team of experts explore the feasibility of building another sea-level canal in 
Panama or elsewhere in Central America. In 1963, Kennedy pleased the Panamanians 
with the inauguration of a bridge over the Panama Canal and the designation of 15 sites 
within the Canal Zone where the flags of both nations would be flown.46  
The Flag Riots of 1964 have generally been characterized as the last straw for the 
Panamanians. According to authors Herbert and Mary Knapp, who lived and worked in 
the Panama Canal Zone for 19 years, Canal Zone Governor, Robert J. Fleming, did not 
judge the U.S. government’s decision to fly dual U.S. and Panamanian flags side-by-side 
in public locations in the zone to include schools. The governor ordered all flags be 
removed from the schools, and when the kids returned from Christmas break in January 
1964, they were disheartened to see that their flags were not flying. But the flagpole still 
remained. For several days the kids at Balboa High School, on the Pacific side of the 
Canal Zone, complained and petitioned the school to allow them to fly American flags. 
Early in the morning on January 7, before school started, approximately 75 students in a 
spectacle before several hundred others hoisted the American flag on the single existing 
flagpole in an act of defiance in front of the high school. When school started for the day, 
several school administrators removed the flag, but it only triggered what can be 
described as an adult supported protest for the next two days, as junior college students 
arrived thirty minutes later to raise another American flag, and small groups of students 
and sympathizing adults stood watch over the flag for the next two days. Their protest 
was not based on opposition to the dual-flag policy, but rather opposition to the removal 
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of the American flag.47 Nevertheless, it further dramatized how unstable public attitudes 
in Panama had become. 
On the morning of January 9, a group of 200 Panamanian students arrived to the 
zone and headed toward Balboa High School. Zone police stopped them, but five of them 
were allowed to proceed to the flagpole with their tattered Panamanian flag. The 
Panamanian group wanted the American students to take down their flag and have the 
Panamanian flag flown instead. An argument broke out between the students at the 
flagpole and zone police escorted the group of five Panamanian students away. When the 
five students returned to their larger group, they told their compadres the Americans had 
beaten them and the police had mangled the Panamanian flag. The entire crowd set off 
running and threw rocks at houses and overturned trashcans, making a general 
commotion. Upon returning to Panama City, the students told reporters that Zonians had 
shot at them as they were leaving the zone. As can be imagined, the news set off massive 
rioting, to include burning and looting in multiple areas of Panama, which left hundreds 
injured and 24 dead, including four Americans.48 
Panama officially suspended its relations with the United States as a result of the 
1964 Flag Riots, the first major event with Panama to confront President Lyndon B. 
Johnson following President Kennedy’s assassination. Johnson agreed that it would be in 
the United States’ best interest to explore new negotiations with Panama regarding the 
Panama Canal. The two countries worked diligently to produce a treaty that would 
replace the 1903 Treaty and the three resultant treaties of 1967 eventually became the 
basis of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties signed by President Carter. The three treaties 
were: “one dealing with operation of the lock canal for a set period of time; a second 
authorizing the United States to build a sea-level canal; and the last addressing the issue 
of military security and bases in the canal.”49 Unfortunately, the draft treaties were leaked 
to the press before either the American or Panamanian leaders could brief their 
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legislatures and thus started the great debate, both in the Congress and in court of public 
opinion that stalled the negotiations for thirteen more years.50  
E. CARTER-TORRIJOS TREATY OF 1977: FINAL CONCESSION 
President Carter was initially caught unaware of the controversy that continued to 
brew in Panama over the canal. Carter’s position was that the original treaty provided 
legal sovereignty of the canal to Panama and that “we could share responsibilities more 
equitably without giving up practical control of the canal.”51 Upon learning more about 
the history and what previous U.S. presidents had or had not accomplished about the 
issue of renegotiation, Carter believed a new treaty was absolutely necessary to “correct 
an injustice,” and that Panama should be given control of the Canal.52 “I was convinced it 
was an unfair original agreement that was foisted upon the Panamanian people against 
their will,” Carter said, “I wanted to treat Panama fairly.”53 
Carter provides his reasons for pursuing a new canal treaty in his book, Keeping 
Faith: Memoirs of a President. His reasons were: 1) to correct an injustice, 2) the canal 
was in danger of sabotage, 3) the canal could not be defended, 4) Panama’s economy 
depended on it, 5) a stable Panama was in the United State’s best interest to avoid 
communist influence, and 6) loss of support from Latin America and other developing 
countries.54  
After the Flag Riots, “Panama broke diplomatic relations with the United States, 
and almost all Latin American nations and the entire community of developing nations 
demanded that corrective action be taken. Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford all 
promised to negotiate a new and more balanced canal treaty, but public congressional 
opposition had been too intense and powerful to confront,” Carter wrote in his diary. 
“The key was giving Panama ownership and control of the canal but retaining the United 
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States’ right to defend it as well as guaranteeing our country priority in its use in an 
emergency.”55 
Besides being the right thing to do to promote human rights and democratic 
ideals, Jimmy Carter’s second and third reasons for turning over the Panama Canal were 
related. The canal was in danger of being sabotaged by Panamanian dissident groups 
exploiting the mantra of U.S. anti-imperialism. Under such circumstances, the canal 
could not be effectively defended. According to U.S. military advisors, the canal could 
not be defended permanently unless there was a good working relationship between the 
United States and Panama. It would take more than 100,000 armed troops to defend 
against a hostile surrounding Panama (more if other Latin American countries also 
became antagonistic).56 The canal had ceased to be of strategic value to the U.S. military 
when it became too narrow for newly built capitol ships in the 1940s. The canal was also 
undeniably vulnerable to attack since the advent of long-range missiles carrying nuclear 
weapons.57  
Carter listed the economic future of Panama as another of his reasons for 
relinquishing the canal. Since its days under Spanish colonial rule, Panama had enjoyed 
the benefits of serving as a strategic locale in the royal empire. During the pursuit of 
independence, Panama dreamed of becoming an international crossroads for commerce in 
her own right. Carter recognized the strength of Panama’s economy depended on 
successful renegotiation of the treaty and he believed that promoting democratic values 
and supporting the Panamanian effort for sovereignty over the canal would have second 
order effects of peace, pride and Panamanian creativity that would enable Panama’s 
stability. While promoters of the treaty knew that there was some Cuban influence in 
Panama, it was strongly believed that Panama knew it was in their best interest to avoid 
communism, which is another reason they were depending on the canal for their own 
economic gain and viability.58  
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Carter’s final motivation for turning over the canal was the moral example it 
would set for other Latin American and developing nations. Failure to act was causing 
other Latin American countries to have to choose between the United States and Panama. 
It would be disadvantageous to lose support from other Latin American countries or for 
them to actively go against U.S. policies.59 The hypocrisy of the U.S. stance against 
Russia’s treatment of its colonial republics, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, during 
the Cold War, while the United States still treated the small nation of Panama as an 
imperialistic conquest, was not lost on Carter. After the treaties were signed, Carter wrote 
in his diary, the president of Costa Rica, Daniel Oduber, “was complimentary about the 
fact that the entire hemispheric interrelationship has been changed by my pursuit of 
human rights and by the symbolism of the Panama treaty.”60 
Any discussion of the Panama Canal Treaties would be incomplete without 
mentioning the involvement and influence of General Omar Torrijos, who negotiated 
directly with President Carter for a new treaty. General Torrijos understood American 
psychology in 1968 when he took over as the de facto leader of Panama in a military 
coup. The Knapps assert Torrijos based his campaign for a new canal treaty on two 
assumptions: one, Americans could be made to feel ashamed of their treatment of 
Panama over the canal, and two, Americans would be fearful of a Vietnam-like episode 
in Central America.61 The authors wrote Torrijos figured “Americans would turn over the 
Canal to Panama to calm their fears, but would tell themselves they were doing it to salve 
their conscience.”62  
Torrijos played hardball with the United States by cultivating international 
sympathy. After little progress with U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1973, he decided to 
take his case to the United Nations Security Council and convinced the council members 
to convene a meeting in Panama in March 1973. At the meeting he passionately made his 
case for the sovereignty of Panama and requested the Security Council to pass a 
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resolution that would renegotiate the U.S.-Panamanian relationship. The final vote was 
13-1 in favor of Panama with United States vetoing the resolution.63 Later, Torrijos 
appealed persuasively to President Carter on a personal level. Carter wrote in his diary 
that during a planning meeting with General Torrijos, the general became “quite 
emotional about what this meant to Panama and outlined the embarrassment they had felt 
for decades about this colonial intrusion into their country.”64 In addition to Carter, 
Torrijos convinced another group of Americans, the U.S. financial community, of the 
importance of the Panama Canal. As will be explained in a later section of this thesis, the 
bankers supported the new treaty because Torrijos had induced heavy U.S. investment in 
the Panamanian banking industry through extensive regulatory easing. If the Central 
American nation were to default on its loans, American banks stood to immediately lose 
over $300 million in investments and that was just a start. So the bankers had no problem 
supporting Torrijos’ vision for the Panama Canal.65 
Once final negotiations were completed in 1977, Carter knew it was going to be 
extremely challenging to have the treaties ratified by the Senate, as many senators and 
congressmen were already on record opposing any new treaty for the Panama Canal. 
Anti-treaty forces within the Republican Party, led by Ronald Reagan, were in full force 
for more than three years since renegotiation principles had been publicized in 1974. 
After much consternation and controversy by the pro- and con-forces of the United States 
government, the Carter-Torrijos Treaty was finally officially ratified on September 26, 
1979.66 
The concluding Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 finally gave the nation of Panama 
what it wanted: complete sovereignty over their national territory and control of the 
Panama Canal. The agreement consisted of two treaties. The Treaty Concerning the 
Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal declared that as an 
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international transit waterway, the canal should remain permanently neutral.67 The 
Panama Canal Treaty, which was based on the Kissinger-Tack agreement of 1974, and 
indirectly from the earlier negotiations in 1967, abrogated the 1903 Treaty. In addition to 
turning over the Panama Canal to Panama on December 31, 1999, the Carter-Torrijos 
Treaty of 1977, which was ratified by Congress in 1978, authorized the return of the 
entire Canal Zone, including a multitude of U.S. military bases that would be gradually 
released to Panamanian control over twenty years. The treaty denied the right of any 
residual U.S. military forces. Furthermore, U.S. personnel would train the Panamanians 
how to operate and maintain the canal as Panamanian personnel took over the majority of 
administrative positions. The United States would still be able to defend the canal if it felt 
it had a vital interest in doing so. By the end of the century, the giant grasping hand 
around the isthmus would no longer have its grip on Panama.68  
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IV. TWENTY-YEAR INTERLUDE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Carter-Torrijos Treaty was formally ratified on October 1, 1979, and the final 
handover of the Panama Canal and surrounding Canal Zone properties took place on 
December 31, 1999. There were good reasons for a 20-year turnover process. It would 
allow time for the Panamanians to gradually assume controlling positions in the Isthmian 
Canal Commission and learn the mechanics of running the canal and maintaining the 
equipment. It would also allow Panama a lengthy period of time in which to plan for each 
reverted U.S. military base, including usage of real estate, permanent physical buildings 
and infrastructure.  
As Falcoff alluded to, there were a number of challenges that Panama would face 
in taking over the canal and associated properties. Besides learning how to take care of 
the canal and what to do with reverted properties, Panama would need to figure out how 
to replace thousands of lucrative U.S. civil service jobs with what would become 
Panamanian jobs. Panama would also have to set aside funds for long term improvements 
to the canal in order to keep it competitive with other global shipping routes. 
Additionally, Panama would have to lower widespread public expectations that the canal 
would solve all of the nation’s problems.69 During the 1980s, the United States assumed 
Panama was incapable of running the canal, and indeed, Panamanians were scared. 
Evidence would show that Panama was very slow at taking the helm. The years between 
1979 and 1989 were somewhat wasted, largely a result of policies enacted or not enacted 
by Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. But planning went into full affect during the 
1990s, with the creation of the Interoceanic Region Authority (ARI) in February 1993, 
and the establishment of the new Panama Canal Authority (ACP) in May 1994.70  
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It is impossible to assess the success of Panamanian ownership of the canal and 
Canal Zone during the 21st century without having some idea of where the Panamanian’s 
stood with respect to the canal in the 20th century. This chapter will address the years 
between 1979 and 1999, beginning with state of Panama under the leadership of General 
Omar Torrijos and the morphing of his economic policies under General Manuel Noriega 
after Torrijos’ death in 1981. It was a period of squandered time when crucial planning 
might have been accomplished but was not. Once Noriega was toppled by the United 
States and democracy was instituted in Panama, preparation for acquisition of the 
Panama Canal and Canal Zone began in earnest. 
Throughout their history, Panamanians “widely believed that a canal across the 
Panamanian isthmus would transform Panama into one of the great commercial centers of 
the world.”71 But as documented in Chapter II, the Panamanians received little benefit 
from the canal, and spent the better part of the 20th century trying to gain economic 
concessions from the United States. In the words of authors Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, 
Panama was simply “passed by the ditch,”72 as years of American control continued to 
deny Panama true economic gain from the canal or “participation in the economy of the 
Panama Canal,”73 particularly with regard to the “commissaries” that provided food and 
goods for the U.S. citizens, other employees, and passengers transiting the zone. As 
previously mentioned, these commissaries directly competed against and undermined 
Panamanian commercial interests, even though concessions gained from the 1955 treaty 
gradually decreased economic impact to Panama in later years.74 
The early 1980s were seminal years for Panama. On paper, the “Canal Zone,” as 
it was known as, disappeared in 1979, but the Panamanian government actually took over 
the zone in 1982. In 1980, the first full year of Carter-Torrijos Treaty implementation, the 
Panama Canal Commission began to pay the government of Panama. Panamanians 
acknowledged they needed to install political institutions that would prevent the canal 
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from falling into a trap of corruption and they needed to turn the canal into a profitable 
venture by running it more efficiently than the Americans. 
B. THE LEGACY OF OMAR TORRIJOS 
On October 11, 1968, Panamanian president Arnulfo Arias was overthrown in a 
non-violent military coup. The next day the National Guard, which was already being 
recognized by the United States for its “pre-eminent political role,” took over Panama as 
“protector” of the nation.75 A new declaration in 1972 decreed General Omar Torrijos the 
“Maximum Leader of the Panamanian Revolution.”76 The new constitution not only 
provided legal legitimacy for the regime, it empowered Torrijos with an unprecedented 
six-year term.77 Publicly, Demetrio Lakas was named to be the pro forma president of 
Panama, but in actuality Torrijos made all social, economic and foreign policy 
decisions.78 
According to Panamanian-born author Carlos Guevara Mann, Omar Torrijos’ 
tenure was characterized by a three-pronged approach in his policies. First, Torrijos 
amassed wide appeal throughout Panama, especially among the poor, by espousing 
nationalist rhetoric focused on gaining sovereignty of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone. 
Second, he instituted populist programs designed to redistribute wealth to various sectors 
of society through a multitude of co-option and corruption schemes. Third, while 
outwardly denouncing the traditional oligarchy, he actually catered to the propertied class 
by expanding opportunities for growth of key business constituents and foreign 
investors.79 
The motive for Torrijos’ actions never went beyond the sustainment of his regime 
and the power of the National Guard. In order to gain support from the people, he devised 
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an inclusionary plan to co-opt the campesinos (farmers or land-laborers) and other 
disadvantaged classes that had been deprived and oppressed by the former ruling 
oligarchy. In the late 1960s, more than half of the Panamanian population was living in 
poverty.80  
Torrijos deftly understood that in the peasants lay the roots of his power 
because, outside of the Canal area’s ribbon of land, Panama is an 
agricultural country where half the population resided. These peasants’ 
inborn resentment of their mistreatment and depravation under the 
oligarch could be harnessed and channeled into a campaign against the 
hegemonic rule of the United States.81 
This sense of nationalism on the part of the underrepresented rural and poverty stricken 
classes that Torrijos was able to tap into was the foundation of his popular support for the 
first ten years of his dictatorship. Additionally, the reforms discussed in the following 
paragraphs were enough to convince the lower classes that Torrijos was on their side, the 
side of social justice.82 This was an illusion but, for a while, a powerful one. 
Torrijos implemented appealing populist policies early in his term. He began a 
long-term trend of public sector expansion, ultimately “diminishing importance of the 
Canal Zone and the banana enclaves within the national economy.”83 In greatly 
expanding the civic sector primarily through national investment of foreign capital, 
Torrijos co-opted a new bureaucratic lower-middle class of over 25,000 by providing 
jobs, special services, and discounted public housing.84 Another attractive project was a 
land redistribution program that allocated property to the very poorest campesinos and 
was accompanied by special loans for land development.85 
In addition to public sector growth and the implementation of land distribution, 
the Torrijos regime reformed the Labor Code in 1972 to benefit workers and peasants. 
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This inclusive nationalist policy included “guaranteeing an extra month’s bonus pay, 
maternity leave (for the first time), a reduction in the number of foreign-born workers 
allowed in any place of employment (from 25 to 10 percent), and a restriction on 
employers’ ability to unilaterally change work conditions.”86 Furthermore, a new 
Worker’s Bank was created to supply loans to laborers previously unable to access 
capital. Torrijos incorporated labor unions into the political machination and by 1973, 
about 20 percent of the Panamanian workforce were not only members of the unions, but 
also avid supporters of the Torrijos regime.87 
In an effort to build and maintain the power of his closest allies as well as the 
Panamanian National Guard, Torrijos embraced schemes of corruption typical of Latin 
American dictatorships of the era. He installed friends and family into his bureaucracy, 
supplied favors and surplus government revenue to National Guard leaders and officers, 
and diverted funds from the state accounts into private businesses run by loyal cronies. 
The effect may have strengthened his political position, but it reduced “the possibilities 
for diversification, which Panama’s economy urgently required.”88 Under Torrijos there 
was less and less private-sector economic activity to counterbalance the growing public 
sector and burgeoning national debt which resulted from the fact that it was foreign 
capital that was utilized to create that public sector.89 
Economically, Panama became “a center for export by multinational corporations 
of goods and services to Latin America,”90 which made it attractive for American 
investors. By 1978, American investment in Panama totaled more than that in all of the 
rest of Central America combined. Because Panama’s legal currency was the U.S. dollar, 
companies “could service dollar transactions overseas profitably, beyond the reach of 
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U.S. regulations.”91 Under Torrijos, the economy of Panama was increasingly based, not 
on the Panama Canal, but foreign investment and offshore banking industries. 
Torrijos’ was able to stimulate some economic growth primarily through the 
periodic nationalization of foreign-owned industries. The U.S.-owned Compañía 
Panameña de Feurza y Luz, the electric power company that serviced Panama City and 
Colon, was nationalized in 1972, and a subsidiary communications company of U.S.-
owned Western Union was nationalized in 1974. Around the same time, through a new 
contract between Panama and a U.S. company, United Brands, Panama acquired large 
banana plantations and a percentage of them were leased back to United Brands to 
manage and export bananas. The remaining plantations were transformed into a state 
banana company. Torrijos also instituted a liberal banking scheme enabling the 
establishment of a plethora of banking institutions that became immediately willing to 
finance Torrijos’ populist policies. This also added to economic growth and assisted the 
population by providing jobs.92 
The reliance on foreign capital to support the public sector caused massive debt. 
By 1980, Panama had the highest indebtedness in Latin America, with foreign debt 
totaling close to $2.1 billion, much of it originating from the United States.93 In 
accordance with recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, the government 
was forced to cut approximately 18,000 temporary public employees, but instead of 
making significant cuts within the permanent public sector, the Torrijos regime turned to 
inviting foreign investment into the private sector—the main constituent of which was the 
Panama Canal and supporting Canal Zone. These latter properties would slowly begin 
reverting to Panamanian ownership beginning in 1979.94 
Torrijos had originally argued for maximum public use of reverted properties as 
they were turned over to Panama, in order to persuade the public to approve the Carter-
Torrijos Treaty. Once the treaty was signed, a societal debate over public-versus private-
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sector expansion in the Canal Zone became a significant issue. Torrijos wanted to ensure 
there was ample opportunity for private investment in the reverted properties in order to 
stimulate the economy, but the regime recognized a need to balance the mix of public and 
private sector relationships within the Canal Zone.95 
Up until 1977, public discourse in Panama fervently revolved around anti-
American nationalism and the quest for sovereignty over the Panama Canal. When the 
treaty was signed, Panamanians reveled in their success at negotiating for their national 
treasure, but once sovereignty was no longer an issue, Panamanians directed their 
attention to the economic realities and failures of the government to provide for the 
nation. Widespread opposition increased as society denounced corruption of the regime. 
Torrijos, although no stranger to brutal oppressive tactics, sought to appease the 
Panamanians and the Carter administration, which was pressuring him about human 
rights, by implementing several reforming policies. He allowed the return of exiles, and 
permitted the renewal of limited political party activity, as well as independent media. He 
also passed a constitutional reform that would consider a “return to the system of 
proportional representation and direct presidential elections in 1984.”96  
Torrijos’ “pan o palo” (bread or club) policies had lasting effects, which 
continued into the dictatorship of his successor, General Manuel Antonio Noriega. There 
are at least two reasons Torrijos was remembered with any fondness by the Panamanian 
people. First, some of his initial populist “pan” measures did provide economic relief to 
Panama’s lower classes. Second, Noriega’s exceptionally brutal reign turned out to be 
more detrimental than that of Torrijos for Panamanian citizens. During Torrijos’ early 
years, land reform and agriculture legislation spurred domestic food production and many 
Panamanians benefitted from Torrijos’ transformation of Panama into an international 
banking center. But overall, by the time of his unexpected death in a plane crash in 1981, 
the negative effects of Torrijos’ policies outweighed the benefits: 
Economic deterioration was a major result of the dictatorship’s 
redistribution policies, aimed not at authentic human development, but at 
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buying support for the regime. Economic mismanagement and widespread 
graft, financed by foreign capital, brought alarming indebtedness and, as a 
consequence, an actual deepening of dependence.97  
Throughout the 1970s, Panama was in a position to make genuine gains in 
economic growth to aid all classes, particularly through U.S. investment. The nation 
initially benefitted from banana exports through the United Fruit Company (since the 
early 1900s), and as that dwindled, Panama’s emergence as a multi-national service 
center with free trade zones and geographically advantageous ports in which to move 
“dollarized” goods to and through Latin America prevailed. Unfortunately whatever real 
potential General Torrijos had at raising the economic success for people of Panama, was 
ruined by corruption and mismanagement, which kept Panama’s middle and lower 
classes economically disadvantaged by an unequal distribution of wealth in Torrijos’ 
policies. 
C. THE NORIEGA YEARS: WASTED TIME 
Since Panama had no control over the Panama Canal prior to 1979, the nation 
concentrated on specialized growth sectors that were “designed to capitalize on the 
Panama Canal as best they could without having control over the canal itself. These 
sectors were flag of convenience ships, the Colon Free Zone, and the International 
Banking Center. These sectors generated positive economic growth for Panama, but little 
employment or tax revenue.”98 
By 1982, what few improvements General Torrijos had made to the Panamanian 
economy through state investment and international services had begun to collapse. The 
nation’s indebtedness doubled to over $4 billion by the mid-1980s, eating up half of the 
national budget for payments. As a result, the government had to cut spending which 
halted national investments, leading to a reduction in workers’ incomes. Between 1978 
and 1982, the international service sector comprised of services to support the canal, plus 
banking industries, constituted three-quarters of Panama’s national growth and had been 
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growing at an annual rate of almost 8 percent. But in 1983, competition from the new 
Trans Isthmian Oil Pipeline (as will be discussed in a later section of this chapter) 
significantly decreased Alaskan oil shipping through the canal. Due to an increase of 
Panamanian workers in the canal (as required by the Carter-Torrijos Treaty) and a 
decrease in ship traffic, Panama increased the tolls, but it was not enough to buoy the 
ever-sinking economy. At the same time, Panama’s export markets in the United States 
and other Latin American countries were battling their own economic depressions and 
similar debt problems. Properties that had already been reverted to Panamanian control in 
the Canal Zone deteriorated.99  
In the Canal Zone, the railroad became unsafe, streets became potholed, 
airport runways became grass covered. Ships were damaged in port 
because of poor facilities and uncooperative labor. Panamanian officials in 
turn blamed the United States for not maintaining the Canal’s facilities 
before 1979… and for making long-term planning impossible because 
Congress would only pass annual funding measures… the Canal was 
becoming dangerously less competitive.100 
Manuel Noriega did little to assist his faltering nation. What should have been a 
critical time for the planning of foreign investment inside the Zone became a time of 
squander and misuse by the Noriega regime. As a lieutenant in the National Guard, 
Noriega had been General Torrijos’ intelligence officer. He was a strongman who used 
brutal methods to suppress Torrijos’ opponents. He was also an informant for the CIA. 
He provided valuable intelligence about the Nicaraguan Sandinistas to the American 
government, which is why the United States did nothing to curb his widespread human 
rights abuses and willingly overlooked his corruption and involvement in drug 
trafficking.101 During Noriega’s rule, Panama became a major transshipment center for 
illegal narcotics trafficked from South America to the United States. According to a 1988 
New York Times article, Panamanian banks laundered $600 million in narcotics profits by 
1987.102 
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Noriega himself acted as guarantor for the laundered assets. Paper money 
flew into Panama as freight; uniformed soldiers picked it up at the airport 
in armored cars. The cash went into numbered accounts in the name of 
dummy corporations created under Panama’s liberal incorporation laws. 
The money was then split up into multiple numbered accounts within the 
same bank, leaving no paper trail, transferred to different banks, and 
finally placed in legitimate investments outside of Panama. Noriega 
allegedly received a commission between 1 and 10 percent for providing 
this service.103 
The United States supported Manuel Noriega until 1985 when a series of 
miscalculations on the part of the Panamanian leader made him a target of American 
anger and suspicion. Noriega viciously murdered political opponent Hugo Spadafora, 
forced the resignation of Panama’s officially elected president Nicolas Ardito Barletta, 
and then arrested his second-in-command, Roberto Diaz Herrera, causing middle-class 
demonstrations and an attack on the U.S. Embassy. In 1987 the U.S. Senate called for 
Noriega to resign. He refused, and instead “tried to sell docking rights to the Soviet 
fishing fleet and asked the rogue state of Libya for aid.”104 The United States indicted 
Noriega on drug charges and subsequently froze all of the Panamanian assets in the 
United States, including the banks, but Noriega continued to resist. The last straw for the 
United States came in 1989, when Noriega boycotted the Panama Canal Commission, 
and ostentatiously “declared war” on the United States, a move followed by attacks 
Americans living and working in the Canal Zone105 Operation Just Cause removed 
Manuel Noriega in December 1989, thus ending military dictatorship in Panama.106 
The effect of all this was to make an economic Armageddon for Panama. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), which was growing at a rate of 9.2 percent in 1981, was 
declining at a rate of 13.4 percent by 1988. An already high unemployment rate of 8.4 
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percent in 1982 spiked to 16.3 percent in by 1988.107 But the Canal still provided hope 
for future prosperity. In June 1977, The Washington Post newspaper had cited a United 
Nations report that indicated Panama could earn an annual profit of $2 billion from the 
canal once it was commercialized,108 and that’s what the Panamanians were holding out 
for. The Noriega years were nothing but wasted time. 
D. PANAMA PLANS FOR REVERTED PROPERTIES 
Panamanian President Guillermo Endara, who had legitimately beat Manuel 
Noriega in the September 1989 election, took over the presidency as soon as the U.S. 
military overthrew Noriega in Operation Just Cause.109 As a result of the government’s 
absence of planning and lack of attention to the areas that had been reverted thus far, by 
1992 the majority of the Panamanian population believed the government was incapable 
of administering the Panama Canal and reverted properties on its own. In February 1993, 
President Endara and the National Assembly created the Regional Interoceanic Authority 
(ARI) “to guard, use, and administer reverted properties”110 inside the zone, which would 
henceforth be called the Interoceanic Region. It consisted of 812,000 acres of real estate. 
The National Assembly also established several major national parks along the sides of 
the canal area in order to prevent deforestation and commercial exploitation of these 
lands.111 In 1994 a former president and economic specialist Nicolas Ardito Barletta was 
appointed as the General Administrator of the ARI.112 
By the mid-1990s the Panamanian government finally published a strategic plan 
how to develop the land surrounding the canal for economic gain. The plan was based on 
a government-commissioned study of how to use former U.S. military bases. The 
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overarching goal of the government was to produce a national vision that all 
Panamanians would be proud of and able to appreciate the enormous resource they were 
about to inherit. Even though Panama had acquired several reverted properties since 
1979, and many more Panamanians were learning about the canal and working for the 
Panama Canal Commission, the majority of Panamanians knew little about the Canal 
Zone other than what a national disgrace it had been while under the ownership of the 
northern superpower.113 
The general objectives of the plan were: conducting a complete survey of the 
areas that would be returned to Panama; determining the best economic and social 
policies for sustained development; and understanding the physical environment 
surrounding the canal to identify further potential.114 The Panamanian government knew 
too much time had been wasted since the Carter-Torrijos Treaty had been signed and 
endeavored to analyze all of the potential costs and benefits of the Canal and interoceanic 
area and determine what objectives would allow for demographic and economic growth 
of the region for the next 25 years.115  
The Carter-Torrijos Treaty mandated all of the property within the Panama Canal 
Zone be turned over to Panama by the end of 1999, along with the Panama Canal. 
Although there were some ideas, the Panamanian government was not sure what to do 
with many of the U.S. military bases that needed to be incorporated into the economy, 
shown in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2. The ARI had some catching up to do in order to 
develop the areas that had already reverted to Panama and plan for the remaining 
properties and President Perez Balladares, who took over in 1994 was inclined toward 
privatization. Amid great controversy, he privatized three container terminals (ports), 
Balboa on the Pacific coast, and Cristobal and Colon on the Atlantic coast in what were 
essentially sales to the highest bidder. Privatization in general was unpopular with the 
Panamanian people, who believed “their government—if not precisely the United 
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States—owed them a living.”116 But it was also controversial in the United States. The 
American company Kansas City Southern Industries won the contract to rebuild a 
container-hauling railroad between Balboa and Cristobal, but U.S. companies lost their 
bids for two port concessions. The Hong-Kong based company Hutchinson Port Holdings 
(HPH) won contracts for the concessions of both Balboa and Colon container terminals, 
having outbid its American competitors by $17 million. The United States government 
complained that Panama had been unfair and opaque in its contracting process, but 
Panama sustained its decision. And although there was initial resistance regarding the 
fact that a Chinese company would be involved with the ports, the United States finally 
conceded that there was no security reason to object to a Hong-Kong owned company 
holding the concessions to the ports.117 
In addition to privatizing a railway and the ports to increase revenue and cut the 
state payroll, ARI leader Barletta “immediately embarked on an international tour to sell 
the notion that the reverted areas represented an exceptional opportunity for foreign 
investors.”118 The ARI offered plans for reverted areas in the ports and port-related 
activities along the Panama Canal with opportunities in railway and other overland 
transport, high-tech facilities for cargo handling, and dry docks and shipyards for major 
repair and small vessel construction. There were offers to investors in drinking water 
distribution facilities, communications and power generation. For the former U.S. bases, 
the ARI also presented potential for tourism, eco-tourism, hotels, cruise passenger 
terminals, marinas, renovated recreation areas and golf courses. Investment in the 
Panama Canal Zone finally became a priority for the Panamanian Government.119 
According to the transcript of an international investment forum in 1995 in which 
Barletta spoke to interested investors, Barletta laid out Panama’s specific plans and 
opportunities for the future of the Interoceanic Region. Highlights follow:  
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As of 1996, there were few services or local products for the 700,000 people, both 
ship workers and passengers, transiting the Panama Canal every year. The major reason 
for this was the poor state of Panamanian ports and the limited range of services being 
offered. Many studies have shown that Panama was a perfect location for container 
transshipment; containers could be dropped at a Panamanian port and moved overland or 
by smaller ships to its final destination. There are 13 ports in Panama and port 
development is high on the list of economic growth opportunities in Panama as well as 
associated services to provide to passengers of passing ships. 
2. Industry 
Panama proposed outstanding opportunities for industry with the combination of 
improved ports, projected container transshipment and airport integration. Advantages of 
creating and investing in an industrial park in Panama included easy access to Latin 
America customers through the Colon Free Zone, easy credit from Panamanian banks, 
and a large bilingual work force. Fort Davis on the Atlantic side of the country had 
already been transformed into an industrial park and should be considered for further 
business and development. 
3. Tourism 
Barletta believes Panama is the perfect location for tourism, expressing “With 
lush tropical forests and jungles, Spanish forts, a warm climate, beautiful beaches and one 
of the most interesting sights in Central America—the Panama Canal—Panama has the 
potential to be a top-ranked tourist destination.”120 Plans have been completed to turn 
Fort Amador, which is made of three islands connected by a causeway, into a premier 
tourist destination. Included in those plans are major resort hotels, a golf course, 
swimming pools, shopping mall, and cruise ship pier. The major attraction, of course, 
will be the Panama Canal, of which the Pacific entrance is viewable from Fort Amador. 
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4. Eco-Tourism 
Panama is home to approximately 300 species of birds, 1,000 species of orchids, 
lush tropical forests, beautiful lakes, exotic butterflies and howler monkeys. Much of this 
flora and fauna is contained within National Parks. Panama has some of the best bio-
diversity in the world, and it is a great place to study the environment. Fort Sherman on 
the Caribbean side of the country would be an appealing location for eco-tourism 
initiatives. 
5. City of Knowledge 
The City of Knowledge is located directly across from the Panama Canal in more 
than 200 buildings of what used to be Fort Clayton military base. Already its own 
international community, it was created for the purpose of business, academic, scientific, 
and humanistic collaboration. Its mission is to provide “an international platform for 
knowledge management to promote sustainable development and the competitive 
advantages of Panama.”121 ARI promotes fantastic opportunities for non-profit and for-
profit research and development centers in The City of Knowledge, similar to the existing 
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute.122 
It is evident that once the de facto military dictators were deposed of by 1990, the 
Panamanian government urgently began to make plans for its reverted areas. Although 
only half of the 20-year interim period between 1979 and the final turnover year of 1999 
remained when the new officially elected democratic government was in place and the 
Panama Defense Force had been converted into National Police, the leaders made 
significant progress in their campaign for the future of the interoceanic region during the 
1990s. Concurrently, the Panama Canal Commission was able to claim substantial 
success in its turnover process of the Panama Canal, which is the subject of the next 
section.  
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Table 1.   Former United States military bases123 
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Figure 2.  Map of U.S. military bases on Atlantic side of Panama125 
                                                 




E. THE PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION 
The signing of the Carter-Torrijos Treaty was a symbolic win, and brought 
immediate political benefits to the government. But the ultimate payoff for Panama 
would not be realized for another 20 years. Authors Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu have 
argued that there were several overarching preconditions required for Panama to succeed: 
It needed a government with strong incentives to refrain from the Panama 
Canal as patronage, and it needed managers to have strong incentives to be 
as professional as their American predecessors…the Panamanian 
administration of the canal needed to exceed the efficiency of the 
Americans. Unlike its past management, the canal’s new Panamanian 
managers would need to run the operation with an eye toward profitability, 
rather than in the interest of a select group of privileged employees.126 
On October 1, 1979, the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) was established in 
accordance with the Carter-Torrijos Treaty, taking over from the former Panama Canal 
Company, and assuming responsibility for “managing, operating and maintaining the 
Panama Canal for the benefit of all nations of the world through the end of the 
century.”127 The organizationally, the PCC was part of the executive branch of United 
States government. Authority over the commission was exercised through the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. The commission was presided over 
by a nine-member board of directors consisting of five Americans and four Panamanians. 
Through 1989, Americans held the position of administrator, while Panamanians held the 
deputy administrator post. In 1990, as mandated by the treaty, the roles were reversed 
with Panamanians taking the lead in the U.S. appointee switched to deputy administrator. 
The Panama Canal Commission was to remain in effect until the expiration of the treaty 
on December 31, 1999, upon which Panama would take full control of the Panama Canal. 
The enduring mission of the waterway was always “to provide reliable, cost-effective 
transit service while operating on a self-sustaining basis.”128  
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Under American ownership, the canal had remained revenue neutral by policy. 
The tolls charged were just enough “to cover the canal’s costs and operating expenses of 
the Canal Zone government.”129 The fixed toll rate in 1914 was between 75 cents and 
$1.25 per ton, depending on the type of ship, and was applied equally to all nations’ 
ships.130 In fact, the toll had never been increased until 1974. And even though inflation 
reduced per-ton tolls by half during the 1970s, the increasing size of cargo ships meant 
that per transit toll increased accordingly. By the time the Panama Canal Commission 
took over management of the canal, the venture had ceased to be of importance to the 
United States, and there were few incentives to either run it efficiently or to make the 
effort necessary to transform it into a profit-making enterprise.131 
As soon as the Carter-Torrijos Treaty took effect, the commission boosted canal 
tolls by 29.3 percent. This gigantic rate hike was required “in order to pay, out of 
Commission earnings, over $70 million dollars annually to the Government of Panama as 
a result of certain payment formulas agreed to in the treaty.”132 With regard to the 
financial administration of the canal, oversight and fiscal operations were simplified by 
setting up a special fund in the U.S. Treasury in which to deposit funds, pay costs, and 
monitor all financial activity of the commission.133 This protected the canal from 
Noriega’s corruption and mismanagement of funds, keeping the entity in U.S. hands, and 
out of the fray of narcotics trafficking and money laundering that was prevalent 
throughout the 1980s.  
The years from 1980 to 1989 proved to be daunting for the commission, 
especially with an ever-increasing number of Panamax ships, which were specifically 
built to the maximum size capable of transiting the canal. Canal traffic and toll revenue 
alternately surged and declined throughout the decade. In 1982, Alaskan North Slope oil 
and U.S. grain and coal shipments dramatically increased canal business. But in 1983 and 
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1984, Alaskan oil was diverted through the new competing Trans-Panama oil pipeline 
built to transport oil across Panama, for re-loading onto tankers too large to transit the 
canal. At the same time, U.S. demand for coal declined, and combined with a worldwide 
economic recession, canal traffic plummeted. The oil pipeline alone affected a reduction 
in canal revenue by 15 percent and forced the PCC to raise toll rates again by March 
1983. A few years later, the canal was in high demand again due to sharp increases in 
containerized cargo and automobile shipments, which by 1988 attributed to one-third of 
canal net tons and tolls revenue.134 Once averaged over the decade, the PCC was able to 
continue operating the canal on a self-financing basis as was required by law. While there 
were deficits in some years due to declining business, capital investment and 
maintenance costs, they were offset by swings in traffic surges and toll increases. As 
shown in Table 2, from 1980 to 1989, the commission generated operating revenues 
roughly even with its expenses, totaling roughly $4.1 billion each, representing a total net 
gain of close to $50 million over ten years.135** 
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Table 2.    Panama Canal Commission comparative operating results (in thousands) 
FY 1980–1989136 
In order to meet its challenges, the commission increased capital investment, 
instituted operational improvements and enhanced maintenance programs. Some 
important investments were the installation of high mast lighting at all of the locks, 
enabling extended hours of operations and improving night visibility; the acquisition of 
15 new locomotives to pull vessels through the canal, effectively expanding its fleet to 
80; the procurement of high speed launches, which would serve as rapid and secure  
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transportation for pilots and other key personnel to get to work stations along the canal; 
and completion of dredging and widening projects throughout the canal for improved 
navigation and maneuverability.137 
In addition to capital investment, the PCC implemented operational and safety 
related improvements. Most importantly, the PCC installed a state-of-the-art 
computerized traffic management system in the Marine Traffic Control Center, which 
provided more efficient coordination of vessel movements during canal transit and 
enhanced safety. Another unique upgrade for operations was the implementation of a 
transit reservation system, which allowed for customers to pay an extra fee in order to 
schedule and guarantee a transit time. The fees generated by the reservations were used 
for funding capital investments. Other safety improvements in the 1980s included 
streamlined accident investigation procedures, buoy conversion to the international 
convention, new firefighting systems at all locks, and new weather monitoring and 
reservoir equipment.138  
One additional safety program implemented was landslide control measures. In 
October 1986, Panama experienced a major landslide in the Gaillard Cut (also called 
Culebra Cut), dumping about one half million cubic yards of earth material and debris 
into the Panama Canal, causing a decrease in navigable width of the channel. Panama 
undertook immediate measures to remove the debris and dredge the canal, instituting 
temporary cautionary transit procedures in order to keep the channel safely operating 
while cleanup was ongoing. The PCC implemented landslide control measures to help 
stabilize the canal banks, including preventative excavation, drainage improvements and 
reforestation to control erosion. Many of Panama’s customers, as well as a temporary 
multi-national advisory board commended the nation of Panama and the PCC for its 
quick and efficient handling of the crisis.139 
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The most important improvement of the 1980s was the prioritization of 
maintenance, which was and still is the “cornerstone of the day-to-day operation of the 
Panama Canal.”140 This agenda encompassed annual locks overhaul, rehabilitation 
programs for towing locomotives and towing tracks, refurbishment of floodgates at dams 
and spillways, and maintenance of power and water systems.141 Without constant 
attention and preservation of the mechanical components of the Panama Canal, it would 
never be a viable enterprise on which to stake Panama’s economic future. 
Besides operations of the canal, the PCC had to be concerned with employment 
and training in accordance with the Canal Treaty, which called for increasing the 
Panamanian participation at all levels of the commission. By 1989, 85 percent of the 
canal work force was Panamanian (Table 3), especially within higher skilled areas of 
operations (Table 4). Special technological and professional training programs were 
implemented in order for Panamanians to become qualified candidates for open positions 
within the commission.142 
 
Table 3.   Panama Canal Commission permanent work force143 
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Table 4.   Panama Canal Commission key occupations144 
From the time the Carter-Torrijos treaty went into effect, the Panamanians 
realized that there would be no beneficial economic progress resulting from the Panama 
Canal unless it was somehow protected from political interference. Beginning in 1989 
with President Guillermo Endara, the Panamanian government took steps to help ensure 
the depoliticization of the canal. These were connected to more general measures to help 
restore Panama’s damaged political institutions. Endara abolished the Panamanian 
Defense Forces, Noriega’s primary constituency, and transformed that military into a 
national police force. He also adjusted the electoral code “to give the electoral courts 
much greater autonomy, in order to ensure fairer electoral counts than had occurred in the 
recent past.”145 
Probably the most important move was the establishment of the Panama Canal 
Authority (ACP) in 1994, which was created to take over from the Panama Canal 
Commission as the official Panamanian administrative agency at the end of 1999. Even 
though the joint PCC was the agency in charge of the canal until the end of the century, 
the ACP was appointed to mirror the organization and learn how to govern the canal in 
the future. The Organic Law of June 11, 1997, was passed to further solidify the ACP’s 
organization, operation and modernization. Because the agency was so important to the 
future of the canal and the future of Panama’s economic stability, it was established as 
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“an autonomous agency with independent budget authority.”146 Further, the Organic Law 
stipulated that the Panama Canal Commission’s Office of Inspector General would be 
carried over to the ACP to conduct audits and investigations designed to detect and 
prevent fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement.147 According to the official history of 
the ACP: 
The Panama Canal constitutes an inalienable patrimony of the Republic of 
Panama; therefore, it may not be sold, assigned, mortgaged, or otherwise 
encumbered or transferred. The legal framework of the Panama Canal 
Authority has the fundamental objective of preserving the conditions for 
the Canal to always remain an enterprise for the peaceful and 
uninterrupted service of the maritime community, international trade, and 
the Republic of Panama.148 
Though the 11-member board of the ACP appointed by President Balladares 
initially caused some controversy, highly qualified personnel were established in the 
ranks, many with solid experience of having served on the PCC board. Additionally, a 
permanent international advisory board was formed to provide valuable multinational 
recommendations and feedback for canal policymaking.149 
In September 1990, Gilberto Guardia became the first Panamanian to be the 
Administrator of the Panama Canal Commission.150 The PCC continued its full-court 
press of operational improvements and enhanced maintenance into the 1990s. The 
greatest challenge was the increasing size of the ships transiting the canal. Even though 
Panamax ships could fit through the canal locks, their transits incurred additional costs. 
They took longer to transit the locks and required more locomotives to pull them through. 
They also needed up to 10 tugboats and two or three channel pilots to assist with 
navigation through the narrower parts of the channel. Beginning in 1992, the PCC “spent 
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$2 billion on capital improvements intended to deal with the needs of larger ships.”151 
Specifically the Commission widened the Gaillard Cut in 1993 and again in 1997, which 
eliminated bottlenecks of large ships waiting to pass. The PCC also deepened Lake Gatun 
by three feet, to ease of navigation for heavier ships with deeper drafts. At the locks, the 
PCC replaced the electric lock systems with hydraulic systems. Additionally, the 
reservation system that had been instituted in 1984 was revamped for greater efficiency. 
By 2000, 40 percent of the vessels transiting the canal had reservations. A reservation 
decreased the average transit time from 40 hours to 17.2 hours.152 
The PCC had to increase the toll rates in 1992, and then again in a two-step hike 
1997 and 1998 to cover expenditures, as required by the Carter-Torrijos Treaty. 
Investments in the capital improvements of canal widening and dredging as well other 
maintenance projects were necessary to turn the canal over to Panama in excellent 
condition and efficiently handle the forecasted increase in future shipping growth.153 
At the end of 1999, Panamanians constituted 96.7 percent of the permanent 
workforce154 and Panamanians filled over 70 percent of the positions in every job 
category.155 It remained important for the PCC to retain a few Americans and other key 
foreign nationals “to ensure competition with international standards for key jobs.”156 A 
main stimulus for Panamanian workforce growth was the PCC’s Panamanian Preference 
Program, established in accordance with Panama’s Organic Law of 1997, which 
stipulated that Panamanians would have preference for hiring over foreigners, and that 
foreigners would only be hired if all means for employing a suitably qualified 
Panamanian had been exhausted. In the event only foreigners applied, preference would 
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be given to those married to a Panamanian or those who had resided in Panama for more 
than 10 years.157 
Another catalyst for the growth of the canal’s Panamanian population was the 
PCC’s Training and Development Department. The primary responsibilities of this 
important organization included: 
Coordinating, evaluating and providing employee development programs; 
training pilots, towboat masters and other maritime field employees; 
producing new craftsmen for the institution; ensuring state-of-the-art 
technical training for onboard journeymen; operating and administering 
training facilities with appropriate equipment; evaluating and promoting 
the use of new technology for training, and providing advisory services to 
management.158 
The PCC’s Employee and Management Development Branch’s mission was 
implementing employee development programs for all levels of employees through 
internal programs and contracted instructors. Opportunities for off-isthmus courses, 
conferences and seminars were also made available, as well as tuition reimbursement for 
college courses relating to employees’ missions. Additionally, the department 
implemented a Managerial Candidate Development Opportunity Program “to provide 
management officials with a recruitment source for managerial positions subject to merit 
promotion procedures.”159 
By 1999, the United States was ready to turn over a well-conditioned and well-
functioning canal to Panama. In contrast to the neglect suffered by the reverted properties 
in the interoceanic area, the Panama Canal Commission did not waste the turnover years 
from 1979 to 1999. Panama was on its way to meeting the aforementioned preconditions 
of alleviating the canal from political patronage, under professional Panamanian 
managers and with an “eye toward profitability.” According to Maurer and Yu: 
The Panama Canal underwent a management revolution after 1990. Once 
the political conditions were met to prevent the canal from becoming a 
source of elite patronage—first with the ouster of Noriega, then with the 
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1994 amendment to the Panamanian constitution, and finally with the 
emergence of a voter-enforced norm of keeping a “hands-off” attitude of 
the canal—the Panama Canal could operate [beginning in 2000] as a 
commercial enterprise free of adverse political interference.160 
The Panama Canal Commission had achieved excellence in day-to-day 
operations, sound strategic planning, and effective management over all of the transition 
process 
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V. SOVEREIGNTY AT LAST (2000–2012) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis has been to evaluate the course of events that have followed 
Panama’s acquisition of sovereignty over the Panama Canal and former Canal Zone at 
the end of 1999, with particular reference to the way these enterprises have changed the 
nation of Panama. This chapter will consider what has been achieved over the last decade 
with regard to the former U.S. military bases that passed into Panamanian hands as part 
of the transfer of sovereignty. The discussion that follows does not touch on every 
property that Panama acquired, but highlights the most important, in order to illustrate the 
wide range of options that Panama has explored for utilizing its regained territory. This 
chapter will also illuminate Panama’s handling of the canal since taking full control in 
2000, covering operations, the new canal expansion, and briefly, the canal’s 
competitiveness.  
B. CURRENT DISPOSITION OF FORMER U.S. MILITARY BASES 
1. Fort Davis 
Fort Davis, located on the Atlantic side of Panama near the Gatun Locks, reverted 
to Panama in 1995. The base, consisting of just over 4,000 acres and 570 facilities, was 
originally built in 1920 and expanded in 1939. It was the headquarters for the U.S. 
Army’s 14th Infantry Regiment until 1956 and then became home for an infantry battalion 
and a Special Forces group. Since receiving the base from the United States, 
Panamanians have converted much of it into residential areas with private housing.161  
There are two major business initiatives at Fort Davis. One is a premier 
international customer contact (call) center. The other is an export “Free Zone,” which 
affords a variety of tax and regulatory benefits to companies eligible to operate there. 
Influent, an Ohio-based customer contact (call center) company, constructed its new 
70,000 square foot facility on Fort Davis in October 2004. The company provides 
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services to Fortune 500 companies as “a leading provider of outsourced customer contact 
solutions with offices in the U.S, Philippines and Panama.” In addition to the existing 
robust telecommunications infrastructure, Influent chose Panama based “on workforce 
considerations and ease of travel from the U.S. to Panama.” In 2006, Direct Marketing 
Association, a leading trade association for businesses and non-profit organizations, 
honored the Panama call center as a top-notch facility. Influent has benefitted from the 
bilingual English-Spanish capabilities of Panamanian employees to capitalize on 
Hispanic markets for its clients.162  
The Davis Free Zone, the second major business initiative at Fort Davis, is one of 
ten such zones located within the country and they are engines of economic growth. The 
zones were established for the “operation of companies that contribute to the country’s 
development, job creation, the inclusion into the global economy of goods and services 
through the promotion of investment opportunities, and the economic, scientific, 
technological, cultural, educational and social growth.”163 Only certain types of 
companies may obtain licenses from the Ministry of Commerce and Industries to operate 
in one of the 10 Free Zones in Panama. These include manufacturing, high-tech, logistics, 
environmental services, specialized health services, education and research, and services 
companies. As of April 2013, there were six manufacturing businesses operating in the 
Fort Davis Free Zone.164  
In addition to the international call center and the Free Zone, Fort Davis is home 
to the Colon campus of the respected Universidad Tecnológica de Panamá. The 
institution is the second largest university in Panama with 20,000 students attending 
seven branch campuses. The Colon campus was relocated from the Coco Solo area to 
Fort Davis in 1995 just after it reverted. The university remodeled three former base 
buildings to utilize for classrooms, laboratories, administrative offices and an educational 
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industrial plant. The Colon campus prides itself on being a pioneer in the development of 
the reverted areas, and on the promotion of education and culture in an area that was 
traditionally associated with the military complex of the United States. Both 
undergraduate and graduate studies are offered at the Colon campus in the technical 
fields of civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, industrial deep 
water systems, computer science and technology.165 
2. Fort Gulick 
Fort Gulick, on the western edge of Lake Gatun, was constructed in 1943 to 
accommodate the increasing number of U.S. military troops during WWII. A School of 
the Americas was established on the base in 1946. In 1963, it became the infamous U.S. 
Army School of the Americas, sometimes labeled the “school for dictators” because of 
the many Latin American military rulers who had attended throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, to include both Panamanian Generals Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega. A 
number of graduates from El Salvador, Colombia, Honduras, and Guatemala were later 
accused of or indicted on charges of human rights abuses, including torture and 
execution, allegedly using techniques learned from the School of the Americas. The 
United States funded the school to “provide principal training elements—joint and 
combined operations, special operations and civil military operations, noncommissioned 
officer professional development and resource management,” to Latin American military 
personnel.166 In accordance with the Carter-Torrijos Treaty, the school was officially 
closed in December 1984 and that section of Fort Gulick was transferred to Panama and 
renamed Fuerte Espinar. The remainder of the Fort Gulick reverted to Panama in 
September 1995.167  
With the exception of the former School of the Americas, most of the 
development on Fort Gulick has been residential. That section of the base that housed the 
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school was purchased by a well-known Barcelona-based company, Meliá Hotels 
International, and transformed into a five-star resort, the Hotel Meliá Panama Canal (see 
Figure 2). It opened in 2006. The luxury 285-room hotel is renowned for its dazzling 
swimming pool and jungle-side location, just ten minutes away from the Colon Free 
Zone.168 Other sections of Fort Gulick have been turned into tidy neighborhoods. Former 
military housing has been generously refurbished into single and multi-family housing, 
the majority purchased by upper-middle income Panamanians.169 
 
Figure 3.  Hotel Meliá Panama Canal at former U.S. military base Fort Gulick170 
3. Fort Sherman 
Fort Sherman is a former U.S. military base that encompasses 23,000 acres of 
jungle interspersed with rolling hills, streams, and swamps. It is located on Panama’s 
Atlantic/Caribbean coast and borders the Chagres River on its south side. It was 
originally built as a coastal artillery site, but was transformed into the U.S. Army’s Jungle 
Operations Training Center in 1953 containing a jungle land navigation course, combat 
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maneuver lanes, helicopter landing zones, a drop zone, small arms ranges, as well as 
barracks, administrative and classroom training facilities. The U.S. Army utilized Fort 
Sherman for jungle warfare training until it was turned over to Panama in June 1999. At 
that time the Panamanians planned to turn the property into an eco-tourism complex that 
would benefit the economy, while protecting the lush tropical environment and 
biodiversity within the area.171  
Even though Panama planned to develop Fort Sherman as a prime location for 
eco-tourism, the base remains largely undeveloped today, vacant and deteriorating. Its 
single success story so far is the Shelter Bay Marina, which opened in 2005 (see Figure 
4). A full-service base for yacht cruising, the Shelter Bay Marina receives many 
accolades from visitor’s and customers. The marina, which is located at the Caribbean 
entrance to the Panama Canal provides secure wave, wake and storm protection for 
yachts cruising through the Caribbean or preparing to transit the canal. The marina offers 
haul-out, dry storage and maintenance services, as well as floating docks, electricity and 
free potable water for boats, and laundry facilities, swimming pool and restaurant for 
passengers. The complex also boasts a highly recommended hotel that overlooks the 
marina.172 
In February 2010, a Spanish business development company, C4T, received a 
contract from the Panamanian government’s Ministry of Economy and Finance to 
conduct a Master Planning and Feasibility Study for tourism development at Fort 
Sherman. The company was asked to provide a plan for attracting tourism business that 
would be “respectful towards both the environment and local history and identity,” and 
include “a job creating project [to become] a major repositioning factor for the District of 
Colon.” C4T was also challenged with suggesting projects that were balanced in costs for 
development investment versus expected profitability.173 The government’s initial goal 
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was to construct a 200-room hotel and golf course as the starting point of future tourism 
development that would increase the economic expansion in the Colon area (which the 
government admitted was behind in development in comparison to other regions of 
Panama). There was great hope for a plan based on area resources such as beaches, a 
marina, an airport, and the proximity to Fort San Lorenzo, one of the oldest colonial 
Spanish fortresses in the Americas.174 
By December 2010, C4T presented a proposal for the development of Fort 
Sherman at a cost of US$180 million with projected revenue of US$250 million to $300 
million within the first five years, and the creation of thousands of permanent jobs. The 
plan would require improvements to communications and transportation capabilities to 
attract commerce and make business more effective. Infrastructure upgrades would 
include a tunnel or bridge crossing the Limon Bay between Fort Sherman and the city of 
Colon, a new airport, the repositioning of international cruise ports and better roads to 
Panama City. The plan also called for refurbishment of Fort San Lorenzo as a main 
tourist attraction. The proposal was viewed as being “ecologically friendly and culturally 
sensitive.”175 
As of January 2012, however, there had been little movement in the development 
of Fort Sherman and the Panamanian government began a new initiative to attract 
tourism investment. The Administrative Unit of Reverted Properties (UABR) within the 
Ministry of the Economy and Finance, opened the bidding for investment opportunities 
based on the 2010 C4T proposal, to include “six eco-tourism hotels, marinas for yachts, 
cultural centers, eight [housing] developments and entertainment centers.” The initiative 
called for up to 200 tour operators from different tourism specialties and 20 investors.176 
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Visitors to the Fort Sherman area, mainly from the Shelter Bay Marina, reported 
in 2013 that the area was still abandoned, with former U.S. military structures in ruin and 
overgrown by the jungle. Parts of the base and the airfield adjacent to the marina has 
been most recently availed by U.S. Southern Command military forces to conduct a 
disaster relief training exercise called Beyond the Horizon.177 
 
 
Figure 4.  Shelter Bay Marina at former U.S. military base Fort Sherman178 
4. Semaphore Hill 
A fine example of Panama’s ambition for eco-tourism is the Canopy Tower nature 
observatory on a former U.S. military property called Semaphore Hill. The property of 35 
acres is located within the boundaries of the federally protected Panamanian rainforest of 
Soberania National Park, which was founded in 1980 along the western shoreline of the 
Panama Canal. The Canopy Tower dome structure was built in 1965 to house a large and 
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powerful U.S. Air Force radar for the defense of Panama, and was later activated as part 
of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network in 1988, which remained in operation until 1995. 
The property then sat locked up and vacant for over a year (see Figure 5). In November 
1996, Semaphore Hill officially reverted to Panama, and the following year the 
government signed a long-term contract “to transform the site into a center for 
neotropical-rainforest observation and ecotourism,” by agreeing to founder Raul Arias de 
Para’s proposal to turn the property and radar tower into a bird-watching hotel.179 
In 1999, Canopy Tower opened its doors to the public as part of Arias’ Canopy 
Family of eco-tourism destinations, which also included Canopy Lodge, Canopy Camp, 
Canopy Bed and Breakfast, and Canopy Adventure, each located in different areas of 
Panama. The company’s mission is “to share the nature, history and culture of the 
Republic of Panama with passion and enthusiasm, focused on customer satisfaction and 
guided by the principles of conservation and social responsibility.”180 Because it puts 
observers at eye-level with tropical rainforest birds, Canopy Tower has become world-
renowned as a premier bird-watching destination. In keeping with its commitment to live 
sustainably, not only did the Canopy Family reuse the radar dome and building as its 
aviary platform, many of the interior furnishings were salvaged from other former U.S. 
installations. The Canopy Family has received many accolades over the years. Most 
recently Tripadvisor awarded Canopy Tower its prestigious 2013 Certificate of 
Excellence, for a second year in a row. It has also been highlighted in Newsweek, The 
New York Times, National Geographic, Los Angeles Times, and numerous other bird 
enthusiast and wildlife books and magazines.181 
 
                                                 







Figure 5.  Canopy Tower at former U.S. military property Semaphore Hill182 
5. Fort Amador 
Fort Amador, located on the Pacific side of Panama, was originally a section of 
the Panama Bay known as the Balboa Dump in the early 1900s. As land was excavated 
out of the Culebra Cut for construction of the Panama Canal, the dirt was dumped into 
the bay close to the canal, which created a man-made landmass. In 1908, U.S. military 
leaders decided to fortify the Panama Canal with large artillery pieces and chose Balboa 
Dump to build a defense site for the Pacific entrance of the canal. Additionally, the 
United States chose to build a dike in order to connect the new land with the nearby bay 
islands of Naos, Perico, Culebra, and Flamenco to become an interconnected military 
base to be utilized by both the United States Navy and Army (see Figure 6). The entire 
project was completed by the official opening of the canal in 1914, and constituted  
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defense sites at both mainland Fort Amador and the islands of Fort Grant. The breakwater 
formed by the dike also provided protection of the canal’s entrance from destruction 
caused by tidal currents carrying silt.183 
 
 
Figure 6.  Mainland and islands of former U.S. military base Fort Amador184 
Fort Amador was reverted to Panama’s Interoceanic Regional Authority in 
October 1996. According to the Panama Business Law Handbook, the Legislative 
Assembly passed a General Use Plan in 1997 for the development of the reverted areas, 
of which tourism was a primary element. As previously noted in this thesis, the director 
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of the Interoceanic Region Authority, Nicolas Barletta touted plans for Amador to 
become a major tourist destination. The handbook reveals “a Korean/American 
consortium signed a deal with the [Panamanian] Government to invest nearly $400 
million in hotels, a yacht club, a cruise ship landing, a golf course, an aquarium center, 
etc.”185 
By 2013, much of Panama’s plan for Fort Amador has come to fruition. It has 
become a regular port call for the Holland America cruise line, where ships anchor out 
and ferry passengers to Flamenco Island.186 There is a marina and a yacht club, a 
conference center, hotels, restaurants, and a duty-free shop. The former dike has been 
upgraded to a 3.7-mile long two-lane causeway allowing tourists to drive from the 
mainland to the islands.187 A Panamanian tourist website describes the Amador 
Causeway as “bustling with tourists taking in the spectacular views of Panama City. 
There are people watching as ships enter the passage to the Panama Canal, locals going to 
dinner, families taking a stroll along the sidewalk, athletes exercising, sailors coming in 
off the ships, travelers heading to the local islands off the coast…” (Figure 7).188  
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Figure 7.  Amador Causeway189 
Other points of interest in Fort Amador are Figali Convention Center, built in 
2003 with a capacity of 10,000; the brand new BioMuseo (Museum of Biodiversity), a 
large unique brightly colored building that has a much anticipated grand opening 
scheduled for May 2014 and features a two-story aquarium; and the Punta Culebra 
Nature Center, an initiative of the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute that opened in 
1996 and inhabits the smaller connected island of Culebra along the causeway190 (see 
Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.  BioMuseo along the Amador Causeway191 
In addition to stimulating tourism in the area, many luxury condominium hi-rises 
have been built by private investors in Fort Amador, which is an ideal location for 
residents and has amazing views. These condominiums, ranging from 1,400 to 3,100 
square feet, have been sold for between US$220,000 and US$750,000 depending on the 
size and location.192 
The resulting construction has become a concern for the local population and over 
the last several years there has been controversy. The Strategic Plan for the Tourism 
Development of Fort Amador called for an aesthetic design that would preserve the 
historical environmental ambiance of the former base and preserving some of the existing 
original structures on the islands. In 2011, the Spanish company C4T was awarded a new 
contract by Panama’s Minister of Economy and Finance to provide an updated tourism 
development plan for Fort Amador, the second such contract for the firm, which 
presented the aforementioned proposal in 2010 for Fort Sherman on Panama’s Caribbean 
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coast.193 On June 13, 2012, an online newspaper from Panama reported the concerns and 
objections about the government’s new contract for the planning of private development 
on Fort Amador: 
The philosophy of the Master Plan was to avoid the construction of 
expensive real estate projects on the bay, to maintain the attractive 
forested hillsides on the islands, to avoid the intensive use of the islands 
and to minimize automobile traffic by installing a trolley along the 
causeway. Such development would also avoid tall buildings and promote 
a horizontal design more oriented to pedestrian movement in order to 
maintain public access. It intended to maintain and use the historic 
fortifications and their structures. Moreover, it included low-impact hotels, 
the golf course and cruiser ports. In summary, the use of this national 
legacy would have been to make Fort Amador a tourist center for all of 
Panama and provided an environment for educational opportunities and 
recreation with ample vegetation, reflecting the country’s historical and 
cultural heritage and promoting the domestic and international tourism 
market.194  
The government’s updated C4T proposal included plans for a new fairgrounds 
and convention center.195 As recently as January 2014, Panama announced plans for 
widening the causeway to four lanes for driving, new sidewalks, bike lanes and sitting 
areas to accommodate more recreational use.196 
6. Fort Clayton 
As briefly mentioned in the chapter III, Panama has implemented the City of 
Knowledge on the former U.S. military base known as Fort Clayton. The base was 
originally established as the headquarters for Commander, United States Army South. 
Centrally located between the Panama Canal and the downtown area, the City of 
Knowledge consists of 300 acres and more than 200 buildings “for the purpose of 
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business, academic, scientific, and humanistic collaboration”197 (see Figure 10). The non-
profit City of Knowledge Foundation was established in 1995 in an effort to plan for the 
turnover of Fort Clayton in late 1999. The goal “was to create a new cluster for research, 
knowledge exchange, innovation and sustainable development not only for the country, 
but for the region as well.”198 In 1998, the Panamanian government officially established 
the City of Knowledge by means of Executive Order number 6, which assigned Fort 
Clayton’s land and infrastructure to the Foundation and prescribed how the organization 
would be executed and administered. The Labor Code was changed to allow employment 
of qualified foreign personnel with professional expertise in research, education and 
technical specialties for the affiliated organizations operating within the City of 
Knowledge. The Foundation sponsors universities, research centers, NGOs and 
international organizations. The City of Knowledge’s mission is “being an international 
platform for knowledge management to promote sustainable development and the 
competitive advantages of Panama.”199 
In 2002, the International Center for Sustainable Development announced that its 
headquarters would be established in the City of Knowledge. The center would be “Latin 
America’s first-ever institute of information and training for sustainable development.” It 
would involve more than 40 organizations, to include the Tropical Agricultural Research 
and Higher Education Centre, the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation, 
the United Nations Environment Program, and the United Nations Development 
Program. The center would “create databanks on sustainable development and offer high-
level educational programs.”200  
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Today, the City of Knowledge hosts six different work areas: 
 Communications and Information Technologies: This are encompasses 
64 companies, research center, and public and mixed projects with a focus 
on “innovation, a state-of-the-art technology component and highly 
qualified human teams.” Its performance areas are software development, 
telecommunications, electronics, multimedia, logistic applications, e-
government developments, IT security, outsourcing and corporate 
solutions.  
 Biosciences: In addition to the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute 
and the Institute of Advanced Scientific Research and High Technology 
Service, this work area contains 30 other organizations dedicated to 
“biotechnology, medicine, and biosciences as applied to the environment, 
pharmacy, biochemistry and other disciplines.” 
 Environmental Management: This area includes 37 organizations 
working on research for climate change, environmental monitoring, 
reforestation, power industry, or on clean development mechanism 
management. 
 Human Development: Eighty-seven organizations fall into this work 
area, and offer programs for sustainable economic development, academic 
agendas, artistic creation and innovation. There are international 
organizations working on disaster prevention and NGOs specializing in 
the economic, social and cultural rights of peoples. There are several 
American universities operating campuses or offering courses in the City 
of Knowledge, such as Florida Institute of Technology, University of 
South Florida and Florida State University. 
 Business Management and Entrepreneurship: This work area of 35 
organizations, most overlapping other work areas, is designed to support 
and empower both entrepreneurs who have business ideas and companies 
that have the potential for greater competitiveness 
 Global Services: Only nine organizations are members of this work area, 
most working on issues of economic, environmental, socio-cultural and 
political development of the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean.201  
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Figure 9.  City of Knowledge at former U.S. military base Fort Clayton202 
7. Albrook Air Force Base 
Albrook Air Base became active as an independent U.S. Air Force installation in 
1924, as the need for an air station on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal became 
apparent. It was home to a variety of Air Force units, such as U.S. Air Forces Southern 
Command until 1976, and later major Air Force divisions, and the Inter-American Air 
Forces Academy. In 1975, Albrook Air Base was downgraded to an Air Force Station as 
some units were moved to Howard Air Force base. The station officially reverted to 
Panamanian ownership in October 1997.203 
Throughout the 2000s, Albrook has been incorporated into the Panamanian 
landscape in a variety of ways. Much of the base housing has been renovated into 
exclusive upscale neighborhoods and sold to private individuals. Many new shopping 
centers, grocery stores, and banks have been erected in support of residential areas. One 
real estate website characterizes Albrook as having “some of Panama´s most beautiful 
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suburban homes. It features various parks and green areas, beautiful tropical gardens, and 
several schools.”204 The former Air Force airfield runway and buildings have been 
reutilized as Marcos A. Gelabert International Airport, with associated aviation support 
services, such as fueling and maintenance facilities housed in existing base hangars. The 
airfield primarily services the domestic carrier, Air Panama, for in-country and regional 
flights, but also has a section for privately owned small aircraft. The most notable 
changes to Albrook are the new construction projects of the Albrook Mall and the 
adjacent National Transport Terminal, which is the main nexus for the national bus 
service and also supports an end destination for the new Panama City subway system.205 
The Albrook Mall is the largest shopping mall in Central America (see Figure 10). 
It opened in December 2002 with an initial investment of $100 million dollars and is now 
complete. It encompasses almost five million square feet with 400 stores, includes 5,000 
parking spaces, and is expected to create approximately 8,000 permanent jobs for the 
Panamanian people. The second, third and fourth phases of the mall were completed in 
2004, 2006, and 2009, respectively. In 2011, Grupo Los Pueblos began construction of 
the fifth and final phase bringing the mall to completion by 2013.206 As one observer has 
noted, even before the completion of the fifth and final phase of construction: 
Albrook Mall has roughly the same number of employees as the Panama 
Canal. It takes 5,592 steps to walk Albrook Mall; roughly equal to going 
up and down the Empire State Building twice plus a few more New York 
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City blocks. Within the total area of Albrook Mall you could build 36 
football fields or five Sidney Opera Houses.207   
The hotel TRYP by Wyndham opened in August 2013 and is attached directly to 
the mall with its own entrance. It is the first of four hotels that were planned to be built 
next to the mall to provide a variety of options for travelers arriving by bus at the 
Transport Terminal and other visitors, beginning with the Ramada Inn with a spa.208 
 
Figure 10.  Albrook Mall at former U.S. military base Albrook Air Station209 
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8. Howard Air Force Base and Fort Kobbe 
Howard Air Force and the adjacent Fort Kobbe are models of development for 
Panama’s reverted areas. Similar to Fort Amador’s tourist development, Fort Clayton’s 
City of Knowledge and Semaphore Hill’s Canopy Tower, the Howard Air Force base 
conversion to Panama Pacifico is an exceptional example of the thoughtful and 
innovative planning for what Panama desires to accomplish. Howard AFB and Fort 
Kobbe on the Pacific side of Panama were both originally the Bruja Point Military 
Reservation established in 1928–1929 for defense of the Panama Canal. The reservation 
was renamed Fort Kobbe in 1932 and the land bordering the Pacific ocean 
accommodated coastal artillery batteries and the Army’s 193rd Infantry Brigade 
headquarters and one battalion. In 1939 the Bruja Point Air Base portion was renamed 
Howard Field, and later changed to Howard Air Base in 1962. The air base hosted 
numerous U.S. Air Force organizations to include WWII bombers, fighter attack aircraft 
and cargo planes through the 1990s. The base also hosted U.S. Navy maritime patrol 
aircraft and United States Drug Enforcement Agency air assets in the 1990s to support 
counterdrug efforts in Latin America. Howard Air Force Base and Fort Kobbe reverted to 
Panama in November 1999.210 
In 2004, the Panamanian legislature passed Law No.41 creating the Agency of 
Special Economic Area Panama - Pacific which “acts independently and is responsible 
for the administration, promotion, development, regulation and proper use of the areas 
assigned to the Panama-Pacific region.”211 This was the first step in the planning and 
development of Panama Pacifico, encompassing 3,500 of the 5,000 acres of the former 
Howard and Kobbe military bases (Figure 11). The project began in 2007 and was 
described in 2011 by Georgia Tech Logistics and Innovation Research Center: 
Panama Pacifico …has become a new model of special economic zone 
aiming to become a hub for high-tech manufacturing, logistics services, 
commercial activities, and non-traditional services, with an eco-friendly 
residential area. A joint consortium between a government agency and a 
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private developer develops an aggressive master plan that includes 
dedicated areas for warehousing and distribution centers, manufacturing, 
commercial offices, airport operations, and residential. An integrated 
system that gathers 11 government agencies facilitate the establishment of 
about 120 companies currently operating in the zone and providing a 
variety of goods and services to international customers.212 
The Panama Pacifico Special Economic Zone was planned to attract multinational 
corporations by offering attractive benefits and incentives. In addition to precise business 
expansion, the ambitious project currently under phased development and construction 
are part of a master-planned community that includes a town center with dining, shopping 
and entertainment venues, as well as a mix of residential housing areas, schools and 
sporting complexes. Several U.S. companies, such as Dell computers, BASF, Caterpillar 
and 3M, were among the first to plant their flags at Panama Pacifico.213 In 2013, 
reporting indicated that the 200-plus companies at Panama Pacifico were expected to 
create more than 12,000 jobs by 2014, surpassing the number of employees working at 
the Panama Canal.214 
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Figure 11.  Panama Pacifico at former U.S. military Howard Air Force Base215 
 
Figure 12.  Office building at Panama Pacifico216 
                                                 




Figure 13.  Pre-planned residential neighborhood at Panama Pacifico217 
9. Rodman Naval Station 
Rodman Naval Station situated just inside the Panama Canal on the Pacific side 
was transferred to Panama April 1999. It was the primary U.S. Naval base in Central and 
South America. It was built in 1943 and “provided fuel, provisions and other support to 
U.S. and allied military ships passing through the Panama Canal.” It was home to the 
only river operations school in the Navy. There were several small commands of Navy 
Special Warfare and small boat units that were based on Rodman as well.218 
In the late 1990s, there was a plan for Panama to lease part of the former Navy 
base to a consortium of Mobil Oil Company and the Arabian Petroleum Supply Company 
for bunkering services and tank farm operations. But there is little evidence that the 
agreement either went into effect or was followed through.219  
In 2007, a concession for the PSA Panama International Terminal (PPIT) project 
was awarded to PSA International, one of the world’s leading port terminal operators, 
owned by a Singaporean investment firm. In accordance with Panama’s requirements, the 
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project consisted of the constructing of a 35-acre container yard, as well as a roll-on-roll-
off (RO-RO) berth able to handle 450,000 TEU of containers a year.220 The port terminal 
opened in December 2010 specifically to import supplies for the Panama Canal 
expansion, a project that will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. Cargo 
container operations then officially began in 2012 with the port handling a little over 
53,000 TEUs for that year. The new berth can accommodate Post-Panamax221 cargo 
ships, which can carry up to 13,000+ TEUs at once.222 More recently, PPIT was leased of 
an additional 50 acres of land by Panama to expand the installation and build two more 
berths for Post-Panamax ships.223 
C. PANAMA CANAL SINCE 2000 
1. Panama Canal Authority 
The Panama Canal is 50 miles long “from the deep waters of the Atlantic to the 
deep waters of the Pacific.”224 It takes an average of 8 to 10 hours to complete a transit. 
The canal consists of a channel, an artificially created lake, and a series of locks that raise 
and lower ships (Figure 14). Vessels must be lifted in altitude to transit Gatun Lake, 
which is 85 feet above sea level, and then lowered back to the sea levels of the Atlantic or 
Pacific Oceans. There are currently three sets of locks in the Panama Canal: the 
Miraflores Locks, the Pedro Miguel Locks, and the Gatun Locks. Ships in the 110 feet 
wide by 1,000 feet long locks are elevated and lowered by changing the amount of water 
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inside each chamber (Figure 15). Every lock gate is 65 feet wide by 7 feet thick, but their 
height varies from 47 to 82 feet, depending on their location and effects of the nearest 
tide.225  
To fill a chamber, the lower lock valves are closed and the upper valves 
are opened. The water comes from Gatun Lake through long ducts, and 
enters the chamber through 20 holes in the chamber floor. To release the 
water from the locks, the upper valves are closed, and the lower valves are 
opened…101,000 cubic meters of water are needed to fill a Panama Canal 
lock chamber. An average of 52 million gallons of fresh water are used in 
each transit…All water used in any lock chamber comes from Gatun Lake. 
This lake covers 163.38 square miles and was created when Gatun Dam 
was built. At one time, Gatun Lake was the largest artificial lake in the 
world.226  
 





Figure 14.  Diagram of Panama Canal227 
 
                                                 




Figure 15.  Panama Canal locks228 
The United States handed a well-conditioned and well-functioning canal over to 
Panama. All the Panama Canal Authority had to do was continue Maintaining and 
operating the Canal to existing standards. And that’s what they have done, to the tune of 
$1.6 billion invested in improvements of the Panama Canal.229 Since taking over, the 
Panamanians have been successful in their goal to run the canal as a profit making entity, 
and provide revenue to state coffers as originally planned. From 2000 through 2013, the 
Panama Canal contributed $8.6 billion dollars to the state. The tolls for the canal prior to 
2000 were based on the weight of the vessel and set to cover the costs of the canal.230 
The ACP changed the pricing structure of tolls by charging different prices according to 
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the type of cargo. It also charged for additional and special services, such as extra tugs, 
deckhands and expedited transit via jumping the queue of ships waiting to transit.231 
The most important users of the Canal in recent years, in financial terms, have 
been container ships. In 2010, 5.6 million containers were carried through the Panama 
Canal, compared to just 200,000 in 1995, much if it from growing trade between East 
Asia and the east coast of the United States.232 The ACP has also been able to charge 
higher tolls due to improved service, decreased transit times, and reliability, which 
shipping companies have come to expect and for which they are willing to pay more.  
As established by Organic Law No. 19 of June 11, 1997 “Whereby the Panama 
Canal Authority is Organized,” and shown in Table 5, the canal has continued to 
contribute to the National Treasury of Panama.233 Even when the nation made the 
decision to expand the Panama Canal, which will be discussed shortly, the ACP has 
provided between 1 and 4 percent of the nation’s GDP, which may not seem like a lot, 
but is significant for a single state enterprise. 
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Table 5.   Panama Canal contributions to the National Treasury of Panama 
The Panamanians made it their mission to depoliticize the canal in order to 
maximize its future potential, and to protect the canal from political corruption. 
Throughout the 1990s the Panamanian voters insisted on the inviolability of the canal. As 
Noel Maurer has observed, any “credible accusations of interference in the management 
of the canal soon became the electoral kiss of death for Panamanian politicians.”234  
The ACP continued to improve the canal and itself as an organization throughout 
the 2000s. In 2003, the ACP opened the Miraflores Visitor Center, where visitors can 
watch as ships transit the Panama Canal and get a firsthand view of lock operations. The 
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Visitor’s Center also hosts a museum and theater, where Panamanian schoolchildren are 
brought to learn about the history of the Panama Canal. The ACP’s commitment to the 
environment is encapsulated in its water conservation program for the Canal Watershed, 
its wildlife rescue and relocation of disrupted species, as well as its reforestation efforts. 
As in the prior decade, the ACP has continued its capital investment for canal equipment, 
maintenance and operations and has deepened and widened the channel as needed, 
ensuring ease and safety of navigation for transiting ships. Additionally, the Panama 
Canal has consistently provided jobs for a workforce of between 8,000 and 10,000, with 
employees from almost every province of Panama.235 
The Panamanians considered their first 10 years of running the canal a great 
success, and they began to plan for a continuation of that success when they decided to 
expand the canal, which is the subject of the next section. As Noel Maurer said, “If the 
Panama Canal declines in the future, it will be because of shifts in the global economy or, 
more likely, shifts in global geography: for example, the opening of the Northwest 
Passage as a result of climate change.”236 
2. The Panama Canal Expansion 
In the early 2000s, the Panama Canal Authority realized the canal would be 
running at capacity by 2011, and would gradually cease to be competitive once the major 
shipping companies increased their use of Post-Panamax ships.237 When Alberto Aleman 
Zubieta took over as Director of the Panama Canal Authority in 2000, he ordered 
numerous studies to be conducted about the feasibility of expanding the Panama Canal. 
He made sure every stakeholder in Panama from the unions to the Indians, in every 
province, was consulted, educated and onboard with the idea. He wanted to make sure  
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236 Gilbert, “Panama Canal.” 
237 The original canal and locks opened in 1914 and can accommodate what are call Panamax ships, 
because they were the largest ships that could fit through the Panama Canal. The new locks and deeper 
channel are being built for Post-Panamax ships up to 1200 feet long and 160 feet wide. 
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that the people of Panama knew what was in it for them. The expansion offered the 
promise of a better life because the Panama Canal would be a catalyst for economic 
prosperity.238  
In April 2006, the ACP recommended to the Panamanian government that a new 
channel and larger locks, 60% wider and 40% longer, be added to effectively double the 
capacity of the Panama Canal. Along with widening and deepening the existing channel 
and elevating the maximum operating level of Gatun Lake, the entire expansion project 
was estimated to cost $5.25 billion, and take seven years to complete. The government 
put the proposal to a national referendum and the Panamanians overwhelmingly voted to 
support the canal expansion. Of the overall costs, $3 billion of the project was to be self-
financed by the ACP through toll revenues, with the remainder financed through lenders, 
and scheduled to be paid off within 10 years.239  
According to the ACP, the overall objectives of the canal expansion are:  
(1) Achieve long-term sustainability and growth for the Canal’s 
contributions to Panamanian society through payments it makes to the 
National Treasury; (2) maintain the Canal’s competitiveness as well as the 
value added by Panama’s maritime route to the national economy; (3) 
increase the Canal’s capacity to capture the growing tonnage demand with 
appropriate level of service for each market segment; and (4) make the 
Canal more productive, safe, and efficient.240 
Although the Panama Canal expansion was delayed early in the process due to a 
mistake in the concrete mix used to pour the new locks, the ACP expects to be able to 
triple its inputs to the National Treasury when the new locks go into operation in 2015. 
The enterprise might even increase its contribution “eightfold, to over $4 billion, by 
2025,” assuming the government does not fall into the same trap as oil-producing states, 
who use rents from a single dominant industry to subsidize the rest of their economies. 
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The ACP estimates that with future GDP growth, the 30% of poverty-stricken 
Panamanians can be lifted up and standards of living for everyone can be improved.241  
The expansion project officially began in September 2007. The majority of the 
undertaking is dredging the existing canal and excavating a new access channel to the 
larger locks. In July 2009, a contract for the most important part of the project, the design 
and construction of the locks, was awarded to the consortium Grupo Unidos por el Canal 
for its bid of $3.16 billion dollars. Joining Spanish construction company Sacyr 
Vallehermoso as the leader of the consortium, are Italian, Belgian and Panamanian 
companies, as well as two U.S. subcontractors. A separate consortium of Spanish, 
Mexican and Costa Rican companies was awarded the excavation contract for the 
project.242 
Construction and installation of the new locks on the canal expansion is the most 
expensive and complicated part of the project. The new lock gates will be of the modern, 
rolling type, replacing the old-fashioned miter gates that are currently used. The rolling 
gates “work from an attached recess that is perpendicular to the lock chamber” and will 
save costs in the long run because “this configuration turns each recess into a dry dock 
that, in turn, allows performing maintenance work on site without the need to remove 
them and without significant interruption in lock operations.”243 (See Figure 16.) 
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Figure 16.  Comparison of lock systems244 
At the beginning of the century, 85 percent of the world’s container ships could 
still fit through the Panama Canal. Post-Panamax ships hit the market strong in the 1990s, 
however, and by 2007 only 57 percent could transit the canal.245 In 2006, it was 
estimated that by 2011 the cargo capacity would almost double with a fleet of 667 vessels 
larger than Panamax. From 2006 through 2011, the number of Post-Pamanax vessels 
increased by 64 percent, and the fleet cargo capacity increased 82 percent. Most of the 
increase would be due to construction orders for new ships in the larger categories of 
greater than 7,000 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs).246 
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After extensive study, the ACP decided upon a lock size of 180 feet wide by 1400 
feet long, which will accommodate ships up to 12,500 TEUs. The new locks will be able 
to handle most of the world’s container vessels, along with supersize tankers and bulk 
carriers.247 The full capacity of a Post-Panamax ship is approximately 13,000 TEUs. 
Once the Panama Canal expansion is concluded, a loaded Post-Panamax ship can carry 
almost the equivalent amount of TEUs in one transit that it used to take three vessels to 
carry at 4,500 TEUs apiece, providing a generous savings to the carrier.248 (See Figure 
17.) 
Increased ship size has already impacted the decisions of the world’s largest 
container-shipping company, Maersk Line. In March 2013, the company changed its 
route from Asia to the U.S. East Coast by going through the Suez Canal instead of the 
Panama Canal to accommodate its growing use of Post-Panamax ships. The Danish 
company has not indicated whether it will resume service through the Panama Canal once 
the expansion is complete, though Panama expects that it will, based on economics and 
competitive pricing.249 
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Figure 17.  Ship-to-lock sizes250  
While container ships constitute 50 percent of the canal’s toll revenue, they 
represent only 30 percent of the total transits.251 Other segments, such as automobile 
carriers (RO-RO) and dry bulk shipments are also expected to continue increasing well 
into the mid-2010s and benefit from the canal expansion. Some anticipated winners 
might include: shipments of Colombian coal and Venezuelan crude oil to China; United 
States imports of oil from Ecuador instead of Nigeria; U.S. grain and coal from the 
Midwest moved by barge to Louisiana and then shipped through the canal to Asia; and 
canal shipment of oil across Panama instead of trans loading to the trans-Panama oil 
pipeline.252 
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Canal expansion is already having a major effect on American east coast ports 
that are readying themselves for more trade with China. Major ports in New York/New 
Jersey; Baltimore, Maryland; Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, 
Georgia; Jacksonville and Miami, Florida; and Houston, Texas are undergoing some type 
of port deepening and/or modernization to accommodate Post-Panamax ships and 
expected increases in cargo handling.253 As explained in The Economist: 
Shanghai to New York via the Panama Canal works out at roughly 25-26 
days, compared with 27-28 days via Suez or 19-21 via Los Angeles and 
train. The route via the West Coast and overland costs about $600 per 
container more than Panama, depending on a ship’s operating costs, which 
are of the order of $60,000 a day.254 
Panama is the “gateway to Latin America and beyond.”255 Included in its mid-
term plans, Panama intends to provide incentives for the transshipment of goods for 
increasing flexibility of global trade routes. Due to its strategic center point between not 
only North and South America, but also between the East and West coasts of those 
continents, it makes sense for companies to use Panama as a transfer point to other modes 
of transportation, such as railway, or to small shipping vessels for onward movement. 
Another benefit of the Panama Canal expansion is the incentive for increased 
diversification of related activities that are profitable and bring value to customers in 
choosing a trade route. Panama is actively seeking ways to create new services and 
upgrade existing ones in the areas of container terminal, Ro-Ro terminal, vessel repairs, 
logistics parks services, bunkering, container barge services, fuel top-off operations and 
liquid natural gas terminal.256 Finally, just the construction of the expansion has already 
bumped the Panamanian economy with the creation of 5000 jobs, and helped boost the 
nation’s GDP from $24.2 billion in 2009 to $26.6 billion in 2010, and $31.3 billion and 
$36.2 billion in 2011 and 2012, respectively.257 
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VI. ANALYSIS: PANAMA AS AN EMERGING ECONOMY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Panama has made substantial progress in its plan to run the canal for a profit and 
has deftly reverted many former U.S. bases into thriving businesses, infrastructure, 
tourism or residential ventures. It is fair to say that Panama has seized the opportunity to 
begin transforming itself into an “emerging” economy, a concept that is discussed in 
more detail below. This is important because Panama has for many years desired the 
prosperity that is realized with further development. A growth economy enables other 
national qualities to improve, such as education and inequality. The nation has 
successfully grasped the Panama Canal to invest in itself for its future. Because of smart 
and very deliberate political and fiscal policies concerning the canal in the 1990s, Panama 
was able to start making a profit as soon as it gained sovereignty of the enterprise in 
2000. The profit not only provided income for the nation, Panamanians also realized the 
canal’s stability can prove a stepping-stone toward further growth and economic 
diversification.  
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF EMERGING ECONOMIES 
What constitutes an emerging economy? Business Dictionary.com provides the 
general definition of an emerging economy as, “Rapidly growing and volatile economies 
of certain Asian and Latin American countries. They promise huge potential for growth 
but also pose significant political, monetary, and social risks.”258 Financial journalist 
Justin Kuepper agrees, “Emerging markets are broadly defined as nations in the process 
of rapid growth and industrialization.” Most international finance experts agree that 
emerging markets share some key characteristics, including nascent but recognizable 
economic diversification, a young and growing population, underdeveloped 
infrastructure, increasing foreign investment, lower-than-average per capita income, and 
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rapid GDP growth.259 In analyzing these characteristics as they pertain to Panama, a case 
can be made for the inclusion of Panama in any categorization of emerging markets. 
1. Transitional Economy 
Emerging economies are often described as “transitional.” According to the 
International Monetary Fund, a transition economy is one that is moving from a centrally 
planned market to a free market.260 Panama’s economy is a mix. The nation has long 
aspired to transform itself into the “Singapore of the Americas” as its political leaders 
like to say.261 The Panamanian government has allocated investments into national 
infrastructure projects, such as the Panama Canal expansion and the new 8.7-mile Metro 
line that is scheduled to begin operations in early 2014. These centrally planned projects 
will incentivize and tie together free market activities that are associated with them. The 
subway will run from Panama City to the bus transport terminal at Albrook Mall creating 
a “convergence zone” with the combination of mall, metro, transport, lodging (hotel 
TRYP by Wyndham), and soon-to-be built casino. The hotels, casinos and stores inside 
the mall are free market activities associated with the government initiated mall, bus 
station and subway station.262 
2. Young and Growing Population 
CIA World Factbook statistics indicate that Panama, like much of the developing 
world, has a demographic “youth bulge” with a median age of 28 years. In comparison 
with a developed country, such as the United States, there are relatively more working-
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age and young people in Panama, and fewer elderly. This youth bulge is important for 
Panama’s growth plans. The positive effect of having a youthful population is that, with 
methodical planning for economic growth, as Panama has shown over the last decade, 
there should be ample labor to fill jobs created by increasing public and foreign 
investment, which will in turn be attracted by the favorable terms on which labor is 
available. The challenge is matching the education and skills requirements for relatively 
demanding, high-value projects. Panama has recognized this and incorporated 
improvements for education.263 (See Table 6 and Figure 18.) 
 
Table 6.   Panama’s population by age groups264  
 
Figure 18.  Population comparisons in 2014—Panama and United States265 
                                                 





World Bank Population statistics (Table 7) show that over last 10years, Panama’s 
population has grown steadily, but at a declining rate. The working age population (15–
65 years old) has steadily increased every year, but so has the percentage of adults over 
age 65, as the percentage of people under the age of 15 has decreased. If this trend 
continues, the 2013 youth bulge may fade, so that Panama will no longer have enough 
work-eligible people to sustain labor-intensive economic growth. Panama’s youth bulge 
thus represents a window of developmental opportunity that it must try to seize. Cheap 
and plentiful labor can be a diminishing resource, and Panama must make the most of it 
while it lasts.266  
 
Table 7.   Panama’s population growth267 
3. Underdeveloped Infrastructure 
The Panama Canal expansion and the new subway are just two of a plethora of 
infrastructure upgrades that Panama proposes. In addition to opening a new subway, 
Panama plans for a new Enrique Malek International Airport in Chiriqui Province’s main 
city, David, and the transformation of the Enrique Jimenez International Airport in 
Colon. Major highway investments are planned between Panama City and Colon in 
conjunction with the reverted area of Fort Sherman. Additional road extensions are 
planned from the interior rural towns, to allow for better participation in the Panama City 
labor market. For the agricultural sector, Panama proposes development of a Cold Chain 
logistics channel that ensures the viability of its perishable food production. Additionally, 
new irrigation systems are planned for the outlying provinces.  
                                                 




Social infrastructure improvement is in the works as well. Five new hospitals are 
planned for the expansion of Panama’s health care system. Upgrades to the nation’s 
penitentiary system will increase security, which is seen as beneficial for tourism. A new 
Panama Convention and Exhibition Center will be built in Fort Amador. And finally, 
planning for the education sector consists of the new school construction across the 
nation and acquisition of advanced computer technology. Panama is ripe for 
infrastructure development and is making concerted efforts to plan accordingly.268 
4. Per Capita Income 
The MSCI Emerging Markets Index, a widely accepted standard in the financial 
industry, includes 21 countries on its list of emerging markets as of the end of 2013. 
These countries are Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.269 Panama is a small country that is rarely 
included in data and trend comparisons outside of Latin America, but according to 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank data, it already ranks right in the 
middle of this group in terms of it GDP (PPP) Per Capita (Table 8), on par with Mexico, 
and well above countries like China, Indonesia, and India, whose recent economic 
success has been widely recognized.270 
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Table 8.   Country comparison GDP Per Capita (PPP)271 
5. Increasing Foreign Investment 
The elements of planned national infrastructure investment naturally extend to 
entice foreign direct investment (FDI) into an emerging market economy. A study of 
Panama’s FDI Inflows as a percentage of GDP indicates there has been much foreign 
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interest in Panama’s development. This is not surprising. Representatives from the 
Interoceanic Region Authority shopped for investors in the mid-1990s, as discussed in 
Chapter IV. Opportunities were presented to investors from all over the world and 
Panama has chosen its contractors from many different nations, evidenced by the 
international consortiums commissioned for the Panama Canal expansion, the Fort 
Amador tourism plan, and the City of Knowledge. Relative to four other Latin American 
countries named by the MSCI Emerging Markets Index as emerging economies, only 
Chile rivals Panama for increasing FDI over the last 12 years (Table 9).272 
 
Table 9.   Foreign direct investment inflows as percentage of GDP273 
6. Rapid Growth 
Another commonly agreed upon characteristic for emerging economies is 
increasing GDP growth per year. Panama’s GDP has risen an average of 8 percent 
annually for the past five years, to $36 billion in 2013. Bloomberg Markets ranked 
Panama sixth among emerging markets in investment outlook.274 Strong growth and a 
sound financial sector have led to Panama’s government bonds being granted an upgrade 
by Moody’s, which increased its rating to Baa2, in 2010, meaning its debt is thought to 
pose only “moderate” risk to investors. Panama is now among the highest rated emerging 
markets, on par with Brazil, Mexico, and Peru.275 
Table 10 compares Panama with all 21 MSCI emerging markets for GDP growth. 
Panama’s growth over the past decade compares well with that of China, and it is one the 
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few countries to have maintained a positive growth rate in each of the last ten years. In 
fact, Panama’s GDP growth, when averaged out over the indicated 10-year period, is the 
second highest out of all the countries after China. Panama can reasonably be described 
as having sustained and rapid growth.276  
 
Table 10.   MSCI emerging economies GDP growth % over time277 
                                                 




C. COMMISSION ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Commission on Growth and Development provides another set of core 
characteristics by which to consider Panama’s status as an emerging economy. The 
Growth Commission’s report on Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive 
Development offers a framework in which countries can create a growth strategy. The 
framework is based on the common characteristics of countries that have achieved 
sustained high growth for the majority of the past 25 years. Panama’s exemplar for future 
growth has long been the nation of Singapore, which is frequently labeled as the 
“crossroads of the East.” Panama and Singapore are similar in that they are both small 
nations and ideal locations for trade transshipment. Singapore is one of the countries the 
Growth Commission highlights as having long-term sustainable growth. It is Singapore 
that Panamanian officials have stated they wish to emulate in their own quest to be 
recognized as the “crossroads of the Americas.” The Growth Commission lists five 
common characteristics of sustained high growth cases: exploitation of the world 
economy, macroeconomic stability, high rates of saving and investment, allowing 
markets to allocate resources, and committed, credible, and capable governments.278  
1. Maximizing Connections to the World Economy 
The Commission assesses that growth countries have benefited from connection 
to the world economy through demand and knowledge. As a primarily service economy, 
Panama is involved in the world’s complex shipping industry, and has invested in 
changes to take advantage of growing global demand for ship-borne trade. Panama 
capitalized on knowledge passed to it by the United States in learning how to operate and 
maintain the Panama Canal. Then they improved the processes, making the entire 
enterprise more efficient and profitable. Now the Panama Canal Authority devotes 
resources and training programs to the continuing education of its employees, and 
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supports canal management curriculums at state universities in order to ensure the 
viability of the future labor market.  
2. Macroeconomic Stability 
There is evidence of macroeconomic stability in Panama. The International 
Monetary Fund asserts Panama’s:  
macroeconomic stability anchored by full dollarization has favored the 
expansion of domestic services and activities centered around the Panama 
Canal and the Colón Free Zone. A successful fiscal consolidation brought 
gross public debt from 66.2 percent of GDP in 2005 to 39.2 percent of 
GDP in 2012.”279 
Similar to a fund created in Singapore, Panama has also created a Sovereign Wealth Fund 
to save excess revenue from the Panama Canal expansion, in order to mitigate against 
external shocks to the economy. The fund is to be used as a last resort during times of 
crisis or recession as well as “the management of budgetary deficits.”280 
3. High Rates of Saving and Investment 
Panama’s public investment in infrastructure, coupled with private investment of 
the reverted areas, demonstrates that Panama is willing to delay consumption to pursue 
future growth and higher levels of prosperity in the future. Panama invested nearly 30 
percent of its GDP in 2012.281 Statistics confirm that Singapore has consistently held 
over 40 percent as its gross savings as a percentage of its GDP for more than 20 years. 
Panama has shown its capability to increase its savings. Beginning in 2006, Panama 
clearly increased its national gross savings up to 36 percent of its GDP (Table 11). It then 
continued to increase over 40 percent in 2008 and 2009, before decreasing again in 
2010.282 
                                                 
279 Corrine Delechat and Svetlana Vtyurina, “Panama: Growth to Remain Buoyant.” 
280 Carlos Cordero Galindo, “An Overview of Panama’s Sovereign Wealth Fund,” IFLR 1000, 
accessed March 5, 2014. 
281 “Panama Economy Profile 2013,” Index Mundi, accessed March 5, 2014, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/panama/economy_profile.html. 




Table 11.   Gross savings as percent of GDP283 
4. Allowing Markets to Allocate Resources 
Market receptiveness and decentralized decision-making are key traits of high-
growth economies. Panama does not have the most decentralized economic management. 
According to the Heritage Foundation’s 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, of which 
Panama ranked 71 freest in the index, slightly above average among the 178 rated 
countries:  
The competitiveness of the economy is sustained by a continued high 
degree of openness to global commerce. Previous pro-growth reforms, 
including a simplified business start-up process and the reduced corporate 
tax rate, have enhanced the commercial environment and contributed to 
solid economic expansion over the past five years. The service-oriented 
economy continues to be a vibrant international business and banking 
hub.284 
Panama has a variety of benefits that provide a competitive advantage. It has land 
available for development. It maintains a buffer around the Panama Canal for future 
enhancements, and there are still reverted areas whose economic potential has not yet 
been realized. All of the major shipping carriers have at least weekly services to or 
through the Panama Canal. The isthmus has generous sea-air connectivity for equipment 
parts. Major courier companies, such as DHL, UPS, FEDEX, Copa, and Avianca have  
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service to Panama. Legal and financial tax incentives are offered to multinational 
companies to establish their regional headquarters in Panama, and finally there is space to 
keep stockpiles from which companies can re-export.285 
5. Committed, Credible, and Capable Governments  
Panama has a stable constitutional democracy and free and fair elections are held 
every five years.286 As shown in Chapter IV, Panama published a National Vision for 
gaining prosperity from the Panama Canal and reverted properties. The government and 
the people of Panama have remained committed to that vision. It is evidenced in agencies 
created to foster depoliticization, such as the Panama Canal Authority, the Panama 
Pacifico Special Economic Area Agency, and the City of Knowledge Foundation. 
Panama’s resolve is also revealed in legislation passed “that embrace and promote 
foreign investment.”287 Law 41 was passed to incentivize investment through “tax relief 
and immigration/labor benefits to international companies that choose to set up regional 
headquarters within Panama.”288 Recently, Panama passed Executive Law 343 to assist 
in overcoming a shortage of qualified worker for its growing industries. The law allows 
foreigners to obtain residency status more easily, in turn eventually easing the process for 
getting a work permit.289  
In summary, from 2008 to 2012, Panama’s average annual GDP growth of 9% 
was the highest in Latin America, while over the last decade GDP per capita has 
doubled.290 Panama’s growth accelerations of the past ten years may be transformed into 
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sustainable high growth through rapid employment creation and structural diversification. 
Construction, commerce, transportation, storage and communications are strong dynamic 
sectors that are aided by Panama Canal traffic and expansion, as well as strong trade 
demand from South America and Asia.291 It seems reasonable to conclude that Panama 
should be included as a recognized emerging economy.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Panama has done well since taking over the Panama Canal in 2000. Since the 
United States overthrew the dictatorship of Manual Noriega, the material and 
psychological incentives that have followed the achievement of sovereignty over the 
canal have contributed to Panama’s emergence as a stable democracy. The Panamanians 
have been able to turn the canal into a profitable enterprise and successfully plan for 
reverted Canal Zone lands through positive political decision-making, fiscally beneficial 
economic policies and constructive management techniques. Depolitization of the canal, 
coupled with knowledge gained by on-the-job training with the Panama Canal 
Commission from 1990–2000 allowed Panama to immediately gain revenue from the 
canal. The government created a vision for the former U.S. military bases and passed 
laws to incentivize foreign investment. The Panamanians voted to expand the Panama 
Canal to remain competitive in the global shipping industry. The government invested its 
own revenue into major infrastructure projects, creating jobs in the process. As a 
consequence of all of these decisions, Panama has achieved one of the highest GDP 
growths for developing and emerging economies over the last decade, despite a good deal 
of turmoil in the world economy as a whole.  
In closing, a final thought about the Panamanian people should be considered. 
The forced alliance between Panama and the United States is what shaped the hopes and 
dreams of the Panamanians, and stimulated a sense of national identity that was 
strengthened as they fought for sovereignty over the canal. Nationalism is still strong 
today as the Panamanians strive to prove they can be successful without the United 
States. Panama is not afraid to dream big—and follow through! Their goal of being the 
“Singapore of the Americas” represents a considerable aspiration, but one to which they 
remain committed. They are not there yet. There are weaknesses to overcome, including 
poverty, corruption and crime. But Panama is on the right path and if it continues to 
follow through with its plans, it will succeed in becoming a model for development in 
Central America and the Caribbean. Panama is a testament to what a small nation can 
accomplish when left alone to flourish. 
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